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I. INTRODUCTION
This article covers cases from Southwestern Reporter (Third) volumes
560 through 580 and federal cases during the same period that the au-
thors believe are noteworthy to the jurisprudence on the applicable
subject.
This Survey period saw a number of cases of first impression, covering
issues involving the waiver of security interest for failure to take remedial
actions, the right for outsider reverse veil-piercing, and whether a limited
partner could waive the attorney–client privilege for the partnership. The
Texas Supreme Court provided jurisprudence on the parol evidence rule
in a debt satisfaction matter and the “public use” doctrine in condemna-
tion and broke new legal ground by permitting a tenant to terminate a
lease for breach of express covenants in a lease when the lease expressly
provided the only remedy to be damages.
Other important decisions addressed construction termination for
mechanics lien filings, abandonment of a prior acceleration of debt, limi-
tations based on an acceleration notice, contributions among co-guaran-
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tors, evidence needed for a deficiency judgment, acknowledgment of a
debt to avoid limitations, the duty of executive right holders toward non-
executive right holders, the rules governing easements by necessity and
easements by implication, the use of forcible detainer action to evict a
tenant for something other than non-payment of rent, and, in what seems
to be a yearly saga, when a case can be dismissed for failure to comply
with the certificate of merit statute.
Cases of particular interest to practitioners, due to dissents, split of
opinions, or absence of jurisprudence, involved whether to seek avoid-
ance or damages under a contract, details for a demand notice, waivers of
limitations, a termination option in a lease, electronic signatures, explicit
maintenance provisions, and res judicata in foreclosure actions.
Perhaps most important was the purported waiver of limitations for a
deficiency claim against a guarantor.
II. MORTGAGES/FORECLOSURE/LIENS
A. FORCIBLE DETAINER AFTER FORECLOSURE SALE
Isaac v. CitiMortgage, Inc.1 involved a typical forcible detainer action
after a non-judicial foreclosure. The deed of trust executed by Isaac con-
tained a post foreclosure provision that read: “If possession is not surren-
dered, Borrower . . . shall be a tenant at sufferance and may be removed
by writ of possession . . . .”2 A notice to vacate was served by CitiMort-
gage upon Isaac by certified mail and personal delivery, but Isaac refused
to vacate. In response to the forcible detainer action, Isaac pled to the
jurisdiction of the court and alleged: first, there was no continuity be-
tween the deed of trust and CitiMortgage’s substitute trustee’s deed,
which was a jurisdictional prerequisite; second, the pleadings were im-
properly verified; and third, there was no refusal to vacate.
As to the first challenge, the First Houston Court of Appeals discussed
the apparent defect in title raised by Isaac in a separate district court suit
(which Isaac lost in the trial court and on appeal)3 alleging lack of privity
of contract between Isaac and CitiMortgage. It is well-established law in
Texas that issues of title do not need to be adjudicated in a suit for posses-
sion, unless the right to immediate possession requires the resolution of a
title dispute.4 In fact, the elements for a forcible detainer action require
proof only that: “(1) the substitute trustee conveyed the property by deed
. . . ; (2) a landlord-tenant relationship existed and the occupants became
tenants at sufferance; (3) [the landlord] gave proper notice . . . to vacate
. . . ; and (4) the occupants refused to vacate . . . .”5 None of these ele-
ments require proof of title. CitiMortgage proved the existence of the
landlord–tenant relationship by submission of the deed of trust contain-
1. 563 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
2. Id. at 312.
3. Id. at 308.
4. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e).
5. Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 311.
292 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 6
ing the language quoted above;6 therefore, CitiMortgage had the right to
immediate possession. As to the jurisdictional issue, Isaac presented no
evidence to contradict long-standing Texas law that a deed of trust con-
taining “tenant at sufferance” language would establish the landlord–
tenant relationship7 and the trustee deed established the owner and land-
lord of the subject property. Therefore, the court of appeals had subject
matter jurisdiction over the forcible detainer action.8
CitiMortgage’s pleadings were verified by its attorney of record, which
was challenged by Isaac as not being in strict compliance with the re-
quirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 510.3(e).9 However, the
court of appeals noted numerous cases supporting a petition in an evic-
tion case verified by the party’s attorney of record.10 The court found
such representative capacity was a necessity for entity parties for which
execution is required by an individual person, and which has been author-
ized by Rule 500.411 in eviction cases in which entities can be represented
by non-attorney employees or officers.12 Further, Rule 502.113 also al-
lowed execution of pleadings by an attorney of record.14 Therefore, the
court of appeals held Isaac’s argument was inappropriate due to the ex-
pressed language of applicable rules as well as the reality that business
entities operate through agents.
Finally, as to Isaacs’ assertion that there was no evidence of their re-
fusal to vacate the property, the court of appeals cited numerous exam-
ples of evidence Texas courts have accepted to prove refusal to vacate the
property, including: (1) an appeal bond which listed the property address
of the alleged tenant; (2) the alleged tenant having been served with the
notice of the forcible detainer suit at the property; (3) a sworn complaint
stating that the alleged tenant was given notice to vacate and refused to
do so; and (4) that there is a tacit admission that the tenant remained in
possession of the property by the continued prosecution of an appeal
awarding possession to the lienholder.15 Isaac was served the notice to
vacate by certified mail at the property and was served with notice of the
forcible detainer petition at the property; consequently, the refusal to va-
cate was deemed sufficiently proven by such evidence submitted by
CitiMortgage.16
6. Id.
7. Id. at 312.
8. Id.
9. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e).
10. Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 313.
11. TEX. R. CIV. P. 500.4.
12. Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 313.
13. TEX. R. CIV. P. 502.1.
14. Isaac, 563 S.W.3d at 314.
15. Id. at 315.
16. Id. at 316.
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B. TAX LIEN TRANSFERS
Fenlon v. Harris County17 addressed sufficiency of the evidence in as-
serting a tax lien transfer. The original property owner, James, was delin-
quent on several years’ taxes and sought assistance from Propel Financial
Services’ (Propel) predecessor for payment of the delinquent taxes. Ini-
tially, Propel paid taxes for the years 2003 through 2007, and obtained the
two required tax lien transfer documents: (1) authorization from the
owner to make such payments; and (2) certification of payment and tax
lien transfer by the taxing authority.18 The taxing authority assigned the
tax liens to Propel and James signed a note and deed of trust in favor of
Propel to evidence and secure payment. During the pendency of the tax
suit, the property was transferred by James’s heirs to the plaintiff, Fenlon.
Fenlon was added to the suit and the trial court appointed a tax master
who found taxes were owed and that the taxing authority should recover
for taxes for the years 2010 through 2016 and that Propel should recover
taxes for the years 2003 to 2007.
On appeal, Fenlon alleged that property owner authorization for the
payment of taxes was not in evidence. Propel prepared a business records
affidavit which was filed with the district clerk on September 8, 2016. The
appellate records contain the business records affidavit.19 The business
records affidavit included: (1) a “Transferred Tax Lien Payoff Statement”;
(2) a “Tax Lien Transfer Account Statement”; (3) the tax lien note and
deed of trust documents; and (4) an “Affidavit Authorizing Payment of
Taxes and Transfer of Tax Lien” signed by James.20 The First Houston
Court of Appeals found that the business records affidavit included the
relevant information for the authorization from James for Propel to pay
the taxes for the disputed years 2006 through 2007. Such affidavit clearly
stated: “[R]equest and authorize [tax lender] . . . to pay the ad valorem
taxes . . . for the tax year 2006–2007.”21 The record also contained the
required tax authority certification of payment, the transfer of the tax
lien, and the recordation of the certification of same.22 Such evidence was
held to show a valid tax lien transfer.23
C. PRIORITY OF LIEN – “CONSTRUCTION TERMINATION” AND
TAX LIEN SUBROGATION
In Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Cathay Bank,24 a construction
lender’s rights with respect to mechanic’s lien claims and tax liens were
examined for the termination date of the contract. Basically, Lyda
Swinerton Builders contracted to construct improvements for Park 8.
17. 569 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
18. Id. at 787.
19. Id. at 793.
20. Id.
21. Id. (emphasis removed).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 794.
24. 566 S.W.3d 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. filed).
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Park 8 was slow in making payments and the contractor suspended work
as of October 4, 2007, but certain equipment was maintained on site in
case the project resumed. On May 20, 2008, the contractor sent a notice
of intent to terminate the contract and filed suit in October 2008. The
construction project was started without financing, but during the term of
the construction, Park 8 obtained financing from Cathay Bank. A loan
disbursement by the bank paid off the existing tax liens. The contractor
filed at least four separate mechanic’s liens affidavits totaling over
$800,000, and a dispute arose between the lender and the contractor as to
priority of liens. To determine the lien priorities, there had to be a deter-
mination of when the indebtedness accrued.25 Under the statute, the in-
debtedness accrued on the last day of the month in which the contract
was terminated, completed, finally settled, or abandoned.26 In this case,
there was not a written termination and the lender pushed for an aban-
donment termination as of the October 4, 2007 suspension of work.27
However, the trial court held the construction contract was “construc-
tively terminated” as of January 4, 2008, ninety days after the work sus-
pension.28 On appeal, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals
considered the definition of abandonment under the statute. The court of
appeals concluded that the statute did not recognize the concept of “con-
structive termination” as a basis for determining when debt accrues.29 Be-
cause the trial court’s judgment on debt accrual depended solely upon its
conclusion as to constructive termination, its findings were erroneous
with respect to the timing of the debt accrual.30
Also, Cathay Bank alleged that its foreclosure sale should have taken
the priority over mechanic’s liens because of the ad valorem tax liens that
it paid off and to which it was equitably subrogated under common law
principles.31 In the prior appellate proceeding between these parties,32
the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals recognized that for common
law subrogation of a statutory tax lien right there are additional hurdles.33
Those additional hurdles include prejudice to the contractor as well as to
the lender and unjust enrichment to the contractor if the tax lien subroga-
tion was not allowed.34 Because the trial court relied solely on the
prejudice to the contractor, it failed to consider all equitable factors nec-
essary; consequently, its conclusion of law was in error and harmful to the
bank.35 On remand, the appellate court required consideration of all ap-
25. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.053(b).
26. Id.
27. Lyda Swinerton, 566 S.W.3d at 839. Also, the court acknowledged that the absence
of completion and final settlement were not in dispute. Id.
28. Id. at 840.
29. Id. at 842.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 842–43.
32. Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 409 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).
33. Id. at 249–50.
34. Lyda Swinerton, 566 S.W.3d at 843–44.
35. Id. at 844.
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propriate equities related to subrogation (such as unjustified enrichment
if subrogation of the tax liens were not allowed) and not just whether the
contractor would be prejudiced.36
D. NON-WAIVER OF SECURITY INTEREST
As a matter of first impression, the Eleventh Eastland Court of Ap-
peals in Legacy Bank v. Fab Tech Drilling Equipment, Inc.37 addressed
whether a prior perfected security interest in accounts receivable could
be waived by failure of the secured party to take appropriate remedial
action. A revolving line of credit existed between Legacy Bank, as the
lender, and Canyon Drilling Company, as the debtor, evidenced by a
note, security agreement, and lock box agreement. The trade creditor of
Canyon Drilling, Fab Tech, obtained a default judgment against Canyon
and filed a writ of garnishment against accounts receivables owed to Can-
yon. Legacy Bank’s intervention in the garnishment action asserted its
perfected security interest on the collateral. After the garnishment action
commenced, Legacy Bank provided a notice of default to Canyon, but
continued to advance funds to Canyon. Legacy Bank ultimately fore-
closed on the collateral. Fab Tech alleged, and the jury agreed, that Leg-
acy Bank lost its priority status due to a waiver by “intentionally
surrender[ing] a known right.”38 On appeal, Legacy challenged the legal
sufficiency of the jury findings and resulting court order. In its analysis,
the court noted that under Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Section
9.317,39 a prior perfected security interest has priority over a later judg-
ment lien that is attached pursuant to a garnishment action.40 That was
consistent with other commentaries cited and reviewed by the court.41
Also, U.C.C. Section 9.201(a)42 generally provided that “a security agree-
ment is effective according to its terms between the parties, against pur-
chasers of the collateral, and against creditors.”43 Fab Tech asserted that
Legacy implicitly waived its security interest in the accounts receivable of
Canyon because Legacy:
(1) allow[ed] [the debtor] to remain in default for several years with-
out making demand, accelerating the debt, liquidating collateral, or
otherwise enforcing its security interest; (2) not demanding payment
until a year after [the judgment creditor] received a judgment . . . and
more than six months after . . . fil[ing] the writ of garnishment; and
(3) making a “nominal halfhearted demand on [the debtor] solely to
save face” before loaning [the debtor] more than $2 million in addi-
tional funds.44
36. Id.
37. 566 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018, pet. denied).
38. Id. at 925–26.
39. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.317.
40. Fab Tech, 566 S.W.3d at 926.
41. Id.
42. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.201(a).
43. Id.
44. Fab Tech, 566 S.W.3d at 927.
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As a case of first impression, the court looked mostly to the Oregon
Court of Appeals in Davis v. F.W. Financial Services, Inc.45 The Davis
court reviewed similar cases around the country, categorizing them into
two types: the waiver approach and the trace and recapture approach,
and concluded that the trace and recapture approach was more authorita-
tive and persuasive.46 The Texas Fab Tech court quoted favorably from
Davis that “a garnishor is entitled to take the collateral; however, in do-
ing so, the garnishor takes traceable collateral subject to the secured
party’s interest.”47
Additionally, the Fab Tech court specifically rejected the argument
that the senior secured creditor waived its security interest under equita-
ble principles by not enforcing its rights prior to the attachment of a jun-
ior creditor’s lien.48 This position was supported under the U.C.C.49
“[T]he disposition by a junior [creditor] would not cut off a senior’s se-
curity interest.”50 Furthermore, a Texas writ of garnishment “fixes a lien
on the debtor’s property or debts due him, ‘subject to prior valid rights
and liens against such property or debt.’”51 Therefore, a garnishor obtains
no rights greater than that of the judgment debtor.52 Even though waiver
is a valid defense to enforcement of a security interest, a waiver must be
an intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct in-
consistent with claiming that right.53 Consequently, there can be no im-
plied waiver unless the person sought to be charged with commiting the
waiver says or does something that is inconsistent with an intent to rely
upon such rights.54
In this case, the security agreement contained a non-waiver clause,
which in relevant part, read as follows: “[Legacy] shall not be deemed to
have waived any rights . . . unless such waiver is given in writing and
signed by [Legacy]. No delay or omission . . . in exercising any right shall
operate as a waiver of such right . . . .”55 The Eleventh Eastland Court of
Appeals emphasized that non-waiver clauses had recently been approved
by the Texas Supreme Court in Shields Ltd. Partnership v. Bradberry.56 In
conjunction to such non-waiver clause, U.C.C. Section 9.20157 provided
that “a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the
parties, against purchasers of collateral, and against creditors.”58 Fab
45. 317 P.3d 916 (2013).
46. Id. at 927–30.
47. Fab Tech, 566 S.W.3d at 928.
48. Id. at 930.
49. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.610 cmt. 5.
50. Fab Tech, 566 S.W.3d at 930.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 931.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 932.
56. 526 S.W.3d 471 (Tex. 2017) (as a general proposition, non-waiver provisions are
binding and enforceable).
57. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.201(a).
58. Id.
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Tech was bound by the terms and provisions of the security agreement,
which contained a non-waiver provision. Because there was no evidence
presented of actions constituting an express waiver of its rights, Legacy
Bank prevailed. Consequently, practitioners have been alerted not to rely
on pure delay of remedial actions, but must seek and present proof of
specific, intentional acts of waiver.
E. ABANDONMENT OF ACCELERATION
Swoboda v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC59 addressed the abandonment
of a note acceleration. Swoboda obtained a home equity loan but stopped
making monthly payments in April 2008. The lender sent its first notice of
acceleration on July 22, 2008 and filed for a foreclosure petition under
Rule 73660 on August 22, 2008; however, that proceeding was dismissed
for want of prosecution. There were a second and third notice of accelera-
tion and four more foreclosure petitions filed leading to the subject case.
The last foreclosure petition was contested by Swoboda on the basis that
the four-year statute of limitation had lapsed prior to the filing of the
fourth foreclosure petition on May 6, 2013, more than four years from the
date of the first acceleration. In response, the lender argued that it had
voluntarily abandoned its prior two accelerations by certain events; in
which event, only the third acceleration on January 28, 2013 was effective,
which was clearly less than four years from the filing of the final foreclo-
sure action.
Each party brought motions for summary judgment and the trial court
denied Swoboda’s motion and granted the lender’s motion; the Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals addressed the validity of the rulings on
these two motions. First, the court reviewed the four-year statute of limi-
tation,61 but noted that Texas law allowed for the unilateral abandonment
of the acceleration by the lender.62 This acceleration abandonment con-
cept is governed by both the general law of waiver and by Texas procedu-
ral rules.63 Under common law waiver theory, the elements are: (1) an
existing right; (2) actual knowledge of the right; and (3) intent to relin-
quish such right or conduct inconsistent with the right.64 The procedural
rules65 required an abandonment by written notice of rescission given by
the lender to all debtors.66 The court of appeals described this statutory
method as the “best means of achieving an abandonment” of accelera-
tion.67 However, written notice is not an exclusive method for abandon-
59. 579 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
60. TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.
61. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.035(a).
62. Swoboda, 579 S.W.3d at 632 (citing Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf,
44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001)).
63. Id. at 632–33.
64. Id. at 632 (citing Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex.
2008)).
65. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.038(a).
66. Id. § 16.038(b).
67. Swoboda, 579 S.W.3d at 633.
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ment.68 Therefore, the court looked at the other events the lender alleged
constituted an abandonment. A typical event of abandonment is the ac-
ceptance by the lender of installment payments after the default;69 how-
ever, that was not applicable in this case since Swoboda made no
payments after the initial default.
The first alleged abandonment event was a loan modification agree-
ment. The lender notified Swoboda of preapproval for a loan modifica-
tion conditioned on execution of the loan modification agreement and
making a down payment. Such notice was very specific on the require-
ments that the “loan modification will not be complete until . . . the docu-
ments [were] properly executed and the down payment[ ]” made.70
Swoboda did not satisfy these conditions but requested other modifica-
tions, which were made. A loan modification agreement was ultimately
signed and returned by Swoboda, but without a down payment, and was
never implemented.71 Under these facts, the court concluded such events
did not constitute an abandonment of the acceleration, rejecting the
lender’s arguments.72 The first lender argument was that enforceability of
the modification should be irrelevant for purposes of an abandonment.
However, the court distinguished the lender’s case authorities from the
current case because the debtor in those cases had actually remitted post-
acceleration payments which were accepted by the lender, whereas Swo-
boda had remitted no payments.73 The second lender argument was that
the “mere offer” was sufficient to establish the abandonment of the accel-
eration. The court disagreed, noting that in this case the lender’s loan
modification offers “did not unequivocally manifest an abandon-
ment[,]”74 based on the language in the notices to Swoboda requiring ex-
ecution of documents and the down payment as a condition to the
effectiveness of the loan modification.75
Next, the lender argued that its subsequent June 15, 2019 statement
was sufficient to evidence an abandonment. With respect to the mortgage
statement, there was a split of authority between certain Texas courts of
appeals and the Fifth Circuit, and the Texas Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed the issue.76 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit had held “a post-accel-
eration mortgage statement that requests a lesser payment than the entire
accelerated balance” was conclusive as to abandonment of the accelera-
tion.77 The REOAM holding was the basis for concurring opinions in the
68. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.038(e)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 634.
72. Id. at 639.




77. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. REOAM, L.L.C., 755 F. App’x 354, 356–57 (5th
Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
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Austin and Fort Worth Courts of Appeals.78 Nevertheless, the subject
court determined it was not obligated to follow those opinions, conclud-
ing that they originated from an “Erie guess” that the Texas Supreme
Court would likely uphold a unilateral abandonment of acceleration by
reason of a notice to the borrower requiring a lesser payment.79 Even if
the federal court rule reflected actual Texas law, the subject mortgage
statement was insufficient to reflect an intentional abandonment of accel-
eration, even though the statement contained the original maturity date
(rather than the accelerated maturity date) and the “Total Unpaid
Amount” (being a monthly installment amount and not the full acceler-
ated principal balance).80 Further, the monthly statement was unclear as
to intent, failing to clarify that the monthly installment amount would
“bring his account current[.]”81
The third lender argument was that its 2009 acceleration was conclusive
evidence of the abandonment of the earlier 2008 acceleration. However,
the court refused to accept this position because the 2009 notice con-
tained no statements which would suggest that Swoboda could believe
that the original acceleration had been abandoned.82
Fourth, the lender argued that short-sale discussions constituted an
abandonment of the prior acceleration. Swoboda had contracted with a
third party for a home sale at an amount less than the outstanding bal-
ance under the existing loan, i.e., a short sale. Such argument was prob-
lematic; there was no evidence that the lender had actually agreed to the
terms of the short sale as requested by Swoboda,83 and to the contrary,
the lender told Swoboda that the lender was “unable to continue . . .
because [Swoboda’s] realtor had ‘ceased to be involved in the short sale
proceedings.’”84 In furtherance of such “short sale” argument, the lender
asserted that a mediator’s report was sufficient to evidence the abandon-
ment. The mediation occurred during the course of the foreclosure pro-
ceeding, and five months after the third-party buyer had terminated the
contract, and never mentioned a short sale.85 Even the deposition of a
lender representative was to the effect that Swoboda had never “received
pre-approval for a short sale.”86
Consequently, the court concluded that the lender had not met its bur-
den in the summary judgment motions and the case was remanded for
78. Swobda, 579 S.W.3d at 634 (first citing Brannick v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No.
03-17-00308-CV, 2018 WL 5729104, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 2, 2018, pet. denied)
(mem. op.); then citing NSL Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 02-16-
00397-CV, 2017 WL 3526354, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 17, 2017, pet. denied)
(mem. op.)).
79. Id. (citing Boren v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 807 F.3d 99, 105 (5th Cir. 2015)).
80. Id. at 635.
81. Id.




86. Id. at 637.
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further consideration. This case presents some clear guidelines to practi-
tioners on a unilateral acceleration abandonment, in the requirements for
written abandonment, and in the action needed to support such position.
F. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Perry v. CAM XV Trust87 involved the statute of limitations for the
filing of a foreclosure action based upon when acceleration of the debt
occurred. The home equity loan originated in 2005 and after payment
disputes, the creditor sent a September 3, 2010 notice declaring a default
and establishing October 3, 2010 as the end of the cure period. The de-
fault notice specifically stated that “the mortgage payments will be accel-
erated . . . and foreclosure proceedings will be initiated” at the end of the
cure period.88 On October 3, 2010, the creditor sent a second notice stat-
ing that it had “elected to accelerate the maturity” of the debt.89 And
finally, on October 20, 2010, the creditor sent a third notice stating that
the creditor had “elected to accelerate the maturity of the debt.”90
Foreclosure suit was filed on October 20, 2014, and Perry asserted the
affirmative defense of statute of limitations, claiming October 3, 2014 was
the bar date for filing an action on the debt. Perry’s contention was that
the deed of trust language together with the October 3, 2010 letter consti-
tuted the actual acceleration date. The relevant provisions of such deed of
trust, read: “[i]f the default is not cured on or before the date specified in
the notice, Lender at its option may require immediate payment in full of
all sums secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and
may invoke the power of sale . . . .”91 The thrust of Perry’s argument was
that the deed of trust provision did not require further demand and made
the notice of intent to accelerate the applicable acceleration date. The
First Houston Court of Appeals rejected this argument holding that the
debtor’s right to two separate notices (intent to accelerate and actual ac-
celeration) was not waived by clear and unequivocal language in the deed
of trust.92 Consequently, the creditor was required to give both a notice
of intent to accelerate and a notice of acceleration in order to have validly
accelerated the debt.93 Further, the optional nature of the deed of trust
language was characterized as not requiring only a single notice of intent
letter. The language of the first notice letter, to this author, appears clear
and unequivocable as to the creditor’s intention to accelerate, but the
second letter was not so clear that it was not an actual acceleration. For
practitioners, if deed of trust language does not require a second letter of
acceleration and demand, the preliminary default notice letter and letter
of notice of intent to accelerate should be clear and unequivocal that the
87. 579 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
88. Id. at 776.
89. Id.
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Wyrick v. Business Bank of Texas94 involved the interpretation of facts
about a collateral assignment of security for a loan to Barquero Energy
Services, LLC which was guaranteed by Wyrick and Ruhnke. The loan
from Business Bank was to be secured by an assignment of leases cover-
ing the leasehold interest in the Barquero saltwater disposal well and an
assignment of stock and insurance policies. When Barquero defaulted on
the note, the bank sued the guarantors who defended based on fraud and
other tortious actions by the bank. The gist of the guarantors’ arguments
was that the bank assured them, as a condition to executing the guaranty,
that the loan would be secured by a valid security interest in the saltwater
disposal well. Despite such assurances, the Unlimited, Unconditional
Guaranty contained a waiver provision making the guarantor’s obligation
“unconditional irrespective of the . . . enforceability of the Note, the As-
signment [of the saltwater disposal well], or any other . . . legal or equita-
ble discharge of a surety or guarantor” and waiving “all rights and
remedies accorded by law to guarantors and sureties” and “all rights to
require Lender to (a) proceed against the borrower; (b) proceed against
or exhaust any collateral held by Lender . . . or (c) pursue any other
remedy it may now or hereafter have against the borrower.”95 Business
Bank proceeded directly against the guarantors without recourse to its
collateral; however, the bank could not foreclose on the Barquero
saltwater disposal well because the bank had failed to obtain the neces-
sary leasehold assignments and landowner consents for the collateral as-
signment to the bank.96
The guarantors alleged fraudulent inducement as an affirmative de-
fense based on the statements made by the bank as to the collateral for
the debt (i.e., the assignment of rights to the saltwater disposal well). An-
alyzing the fraudulent inducement claims, the issue was whether the guar-
antors could justifiably rely on oral misrepresentations which were
contrary to the unambiguous terms of the written guaranty agreement.
Texas law was clear that “a party to a written contract cannot justifiably
rely on oral misrepresentations regarding the contract’s unambiguous
terms.”97 Here, the guaranty explicitly provided (1) it was unconditional
irrespective of enforceability of the debt or collateral; (2) for waiver of
the benefits of all principles or provisions of law that contradict the guar-
anty terms; (3) it would not be subject to legal or equitable defenses; (4)
it would not be affected if any collateral was surrendered; and (5) that the
94. 577 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
95. Id. at 343–44.
96. Id. at 344.
97. Id. at 348 (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. 1962)).
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creditor need not proceed against collateral before enforcing the guar-
anty.98 Further, as to Wyrick, justified reliance was not available because
Wyrick testified that he knew the bank did not have a valid assignment of
the lease because the landowner consent had not been obtained at the
time of the loan.99
Next, the guarantors alleged the guaranty’s unconditionality language
was overly expansive and insufficient to shift the risk to the guarantors;
however, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals pointed out that the
Texas Supreme Court had rejected such theory (to require the contract
and oral representations to explicitly speak to the subject matter) as un-
workable.100 Last, the guarantors alleged the bank made a false represen-
tation in the promissory note by means of a representation that the loan
was secured by the Assignment of Leases; but the court rejected this ar-
gument because the note did not “clearly state that the [assignment of
leases] had been secured”101 and “the [b]ank did not sign the note.”102
There was no authority cited for these opinions, and, to this author, the
latter is a very weak position taken by the appellate court.
Guarantors also alleged, as an affirmative defense, the existence of a
mutual mistake: that neither of the guarantors nor the bank were aware
that there was no valid effective collateral for the loan. However, guaran-
tors relied on Geodyne Energy Income Production Partnership I-E v.
Newton Corp.,103 which relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, Section 154 to the effect that the risk of a mistake must be borne
by the party if such risk is allocated to that party by the subject agree-
ment.104 The subject guaranty provided for liability of the guarantors if
collateral for the debt had been surrendered; therefore, the guarantors
were deemed to have accepted such risk even if it were a mutual
mistake.105
B. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY; FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION
Fortitude Energy, LLC v. Sooner Pipe LLC106 involved ineffective at-
tempts at avoidance of an assumption of debt. Fortitude contracted with
San Gabriel to operate Fortitude’s mineral interests. San Gabriel ob-
tained products from Sooner Pipe, but never paid for the products. Forti-
tude and San Gabriel entered into a Debt Agreement whereby San
Gabriel paid $500,000.00 for Fortitude’s assumption of all debts owing by
San Gabriel and its affiliate, Pecos Production. Fortitude never made pay-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 349.




103. 161 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. 2005).
104. Wyrick, 577 S.W.3d at 350–51.
105. Id.
106. 564 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
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ment under the Debt Agreement to Sooner Pipe. San Gabriel filed bank-
ruptcy and a month later Sooner Pipe, as a third-party beneficiary under
the Debt Agreement, filed suit against Fortitude. In defense, Fortitude
argued that Sooner was not a third-party beneficiary of the Debt Agree-
ment. In addressing this claim, the First Houston Court of Appeals noted
that a third-party beneficiary is established when the contract demon-
strates an intent to secure a benefit to such third party.107 Fortitude did
not challenge the trial court’s ruling; therefore, Sooner Pipe was deemed
a third-party beneficiary.108
Also, Fortitude alleged failure of consideration because San Gabriel
failed to turn over the records as the operator so that Fortitude could
continue operation of the wells. As the court explained, there are two
types of failure of consideration: full and partial.109 A full failure of con-
sideration is the basis for a cancelation or rescission of the contract; a
partial failure of consideration will not invalidate the contract and pre-
vent recovery thereon, but allows a suit for damages.110 Because San
Gabriel had partially performed the contract by paying the $500,000.00
consideration, Fortitude could prove only a partial failure and not a total
failure of consideration; therefore, the contract was not null and void.
The court implied that a full failure of consideration may have occurred if
Fortitude had refunded the $500,000.00 payment, which it had not
done.111 Practitioners should be aware of this point if a contract is pre-
ferred to be voided as opposed to being a basis for damages.
Finally, Fortitude made a novel argument that the Debt Agreement
was unenforceable because Fortitude had acquired, in San Gabriel’s
bankruptcy, all of San Gabriel’s rights for breaches and causes of action
under the Debt Agreement by payment of $30,000.00 to the bankruptcy
trustee; hence, it alleged it owned both sides of the contract.112 However,
Fortitude cited no authority for the contention that a third-party benefici-
ary (Sooner Pipe) under a contract could be precluded from bringing a
cause of action because the cause of action of the actual account debtor
(San Gabriel) was acquired by the other contract party (Fortitude).113
The court specifically held: “We conclude that Fortitude’s acquisition of
causes of action that San Gabriel could have brought against it does not
raise a fact issue concerning the validity of the Debt Agreement.”114
Fortitude also tried to avoid liability to Sooner Pipe by alleging Sooner
Pipe’s actions violated the automatic stay in San Gabriel’s bankruptcy
proceeding. The court determined that the suit was not against San




111. Id. (citing Carter v. PeopleAnswers, Inc., 312 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2010, no pet.) (stating the “right of rescission is waived by . . . retention of the partial
performance rendered.”)).
112. Id. at 183.
113. Id. at 184.
114. Id.
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Gabriel, as the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding, but was an action
directly against Fortitude under Sooner Pipe’s third-party beneficiary
rights.115
C. CO-GUARANTOR CONTRIBUTIONS
One guarantor sued another for equitable contribution in Orr v. Brous-
sard.116 Orr, Broussard, and four other guarantors guaranteed a debt
owed by Prince’s Hamburgers No. 5 to Post Oak Bank. When the bor-
rower defaulted, Orr paid the entire balance of the debt, and the bank
assigned its note and security agreement to Orr. Demand on the other
guarantors to pay their proportionate share was made, but the other
guarantors failed to pay. Orr brought suit for equitable contribution.117
Broussard defended on the basis that Orr did not plead a cause under
equitable contribution, but rather under a deficiency suit under the
U.C.C.118 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals rejected this on the
basis that Texas’s fair notice standard for pleading was satisfied by Orr’s
pleadings.119 Furthermore, the court of appeals concluded that Orr suffi-
ciently proved up the elements for equitable contribution: (1) a shared
common obligation; and (2) a compulsory payment or discharge of more
than such party’s fair share.120
There were six guarantors, so Broussard owed Orr one-sixth of the
amount of the guaranteed debt. Interestingly, Orr attempted to obtain a
greater recovery from Broussard by arguing that Broussard’s liability
should be not one-sixth of the obligation but one-third of the obligation
because three of the co-guarantors were no longer in existence (the other
four guarantors were three limited liability companies and a limited part-
nership; therefore, the authors assume three of these entities had been
dissolved or terminated).121 There was inadequate briefing on this point
and no authority was presented, so the court declined to address this
issue.122
Also under review was the amount of reimbursement owed by Brous-
sard because Orr, as the assignee of the security agreement, had fore-
closed on restaurant equipment and received the right to, but did not,
foreclose on a trademark.123 Broussard was entitled to a credit for the
$750 foreclosure of such equipment.124 The court determined Broussard
was entitled to the full $750 credit to his one-sixth share of the obligations
115. Id. at 185.
116. 565 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
117. Id. at 419.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 420–21. The court ignored the pleadings’ heading “Breach of Contract
Against Co-Guarantors.” Id. at 421.
120. Id. at 420.
121. Id. at 422–23.
122. Id. at 423.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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paid by Orr.125 Such holding seems incorrect to these authors because the
$750 should have been deleted from the total amount owed to Orr before
allocation of the deficiency amount among the co-guarantors. While the
dollar amount is relatively meaningless in this case, it could be significant
in other cases. With no appeal, the opinion stands, but these authors ad-
vise caution as to this method of calculation of the foreclosure credit to
co-guarantors’ obligations.
There was also trademark collateral for the loan. Broussard tendered
the trademark to Orr who refused it. The court considered U.C.C. Sec-
tion 9.610(a), which read, in relevant part: “[a]fter default, a secured
party [may] sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the
collateral . . . .”126 Such language is permissive and not mandatory; there-
fore, the court held there was no offset due Broussard because Orr had
no duty to dispose of such collateral.127
D. DEFICIENCY SUIT
Duarte-Viera v. Fannie Mae128 involved the sufficiency of evidence sub-
mitted for a deficiency claim against a guarantor after foreclosure. The
guarantor, Duarte-Viera, alleged that the creditor failed to prove the de-
fault of the underlying debtor, because the evidence by Fannie Mae con-
sisted primarily of an affidavit of its senior asset manager. Such affidavit
covered: (1) the date on which the loan came into default; (2) that Fannie
Mae posted for foreclosure on a certain date; (3) the foreclosure sale
date; and (4) that Fannie Mae was the sole bidder and purchaser of the
property.129 These recitations, the guarantor argued, were conclusory and
without probative effect. However, the Seventh Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals pointed to an additional provision of the affidavit stating the debtor
failed to pay amounts due and owing under the note and that the guaran-
tor failed to pay the amounts due and owing under the guaranty, and
concluded the two additional statements completed the proof of the de-
fault triggering the guarantor’s liability.130
In reaching this conclusion, the court reconciled the distinctions be-
tween Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co.131 and Ecurie Cerveza Racing
Team, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank.132 The Skeen court held that “the
bare statement of ‘default . . . in payment’ amounts to a legal conclusion
on the part of the affiant and cannot support the summary judgment.”133
The Ecurie Cerveza court held an affidavit was not conclusory even
though it stated that the debtor defaulted in payment, without further
125. Id.
126. TEX. COM. & BUS. CODE ANN. § 9.610(a) (emphasis added).
127. Broussard, 565 S.W.3d at 424.
128. 560 S.W.3d 258 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, no pet.).
129. Id. at 262.
130. Id.
131. 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1975, no pet.).
132. 633 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no pet.).
133. Skeen, 526 S.W.2d at 254.
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factual recitations.134 The Duarte-Viera court distinguished the cases
based on the number of payment default provisions contained in the loan
documents.135 In Skeen, there were numerous payment default provi-
sions,136 whereas in Ecurie Cerveza, there was only one payment default
under its documents.137 Consequently, the Duarte-Viera court deter-
mined the Fannie Mae affidavit was sufficient because the subject deed of
trust contained only one payment default provision and the affidavit was
not conclusory but a “statement of fact.”138
The guarantor also attacked proof of the deficiency amount, which was
outlined in an exhibit to the aforesaid affidavit, containing the following
generic categories:
• Principal balance
• Regular interest, default interest and late charge
• Servicer advances and other fees paid
• Prepayment premium [but with further details of its computation]
• Insurance claim recoveries
• Funds swept credit
• Foreclosure bid amount credit
• Deficiency owed
Duarte-Viera alleged insufficient evidence as to which loan payments
were missed for the calculation of late charges and default interest, that
the acceleration date (for purposes of determining the prepayment pre-
mium) was not disclosed and there was no detail for the servicer advances
and other fees paid.139 Further, the affidavit did not contain a per diem
amount for the default interest rate. Without considering the date upon
which late charges accrued and default interest would have accrued, the
court concluded that the affidavit contained sufficient facts regarding the
debtor’s failure to pay and the guarantor’s liability and was not
conclusory.140
As to the servicer advances and other fees, the court concluded the
recitation of principal and interest due and the payoff amount due was
not conclusory, but was sufficient to support a summary judgment.141 The
court distinguished Lefton v. Griffith142 as being inapplicable because it
did not deal with notes and guaranties, but rather with a deceptive trade
134. Duarte-Viera, 560 S.W.3d at 263.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Duarte-Viera court stated: “the terms of the note allowed several acts or
omissions to be treated as default in payment.” Id. (citing Ecurie Cerveza, 633 S.W.2d at
575).
137. Id. The Ecurie Cerveza court found “only one condition constitutes default in pay-
ment.” Ecurie Cerveza, 633 S.W.2d at 575.
138. Duarte-Viera, 560 S.W.3d at 264.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 267.
141. Id. at 266–67 (relying on Rockwall Commons Assocs. v. MRC Mortg. Guarantor
Tr. I, 331 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.)).
142. 136 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
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practice claim.143 Additionally, relying on Keenan v. Gibraltar Savings
Ass’n144 and Obasi v. University of Oklahoma Health Science Center,145
the court found support for the lump sum stated amounts for late charges
and ad valorem tax payments, which listed principal and interest due
without elaboration.146
For the prepayment penalty, the guarantor alleged that the affidavit did
not show when or how the note was accelerated, but the summary judg-
ment affidavit recited the “lookback day,” being the date the rate was
determined.147 Commentators on summary judgment practice in Texas,
the court noted, did not require detailed proof reflecting calculations un-
derlying the balance due.148 Therefore, the affidavit was held
sufficient.149
Finally, the guarantor challenged the fair market value determination
for the deficiency offset, but the guarantor’s affidavit included only two
items: the declaration of value by the property owner and the tax ap-
praisal valuation.150 However, the deed of trust contained provisions re-
quiring evidence on valuation of the property to be performed by
certified appraisers.151 Even though the guarantor was not party to the
deed of trust, the court found the deed of trust binding upon the guaran-
tor, based on the guaranty’s merger clause referring to the “loan docu-
ments” and the deed of trust definition of loan documents to include the
guaranty.152 The evidence presented by the guarantor was held
inadmissible.153
There was a compelling dissent issued by Justice Pirtle addressing the
sufficiency of the evidence as it related to the various cost items con-
tained in the affidavit.154 In particular, the dissent discussed the prepay-
ment penalty, concluding that, despite some details for computation, the
establishment of the principal balance was a prerequisite for calculation
of a prepayment penalty.155 Further, the dissent takes issue with the lack
of details for their calculation of the regular interest, default interest, and
late charges, and the actual date of default.156 Worse yet, pursuant to the
143. Duarte-Viera, 560 S.W.3d at 266.
144. 754 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.).
145. No. 04-04-000-16-CV, 2004 WL 2418009 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 27, 2004,
pet. denied).
146. Duarte-Viera, 560 S.W.3d at 266.
147. Id. at 267.
148. Id. (citing TIMOTHY PATTON, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS, PRACTICE, PROCE-
DURE AND REVIEW § 9.06[4][e] (3d ed. 2015)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 268.
151. Id. at 269. The applicable provision stated the basis for valuation would be “(f)
expert opinion testimony . . . only from a licensed appraiser certified by the State of Texas
and . . . a member of the Appraisal Institute. . . .” Id.
152. Id. (relying on In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (a
guarantor of a lease was bound by the waiver of jury clause in the lease)).
153. Id. at 271.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 274.
156. Id.
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dissent, is only the lump sum recitation for servicer advances and fees,
insurance claims and funds swept, the amounts of which are not found in
any of the loan documents.157 Rockwell Commons Associates, Ltd. V.
MRC Mortgage Grantor Trust I158 was distinguished because there was
other non-affidavit evidence, in the form of a letter with an attached bill-
ing statement and calculation tapes containing the calculation details that
the court relied upon in finding sufficiency of the evidence to avoid the
conclusory defense.159 No petition was filed, but based on the dissent, a
prudent practitioner should urge more details for the calculations to be
safe from challenge. Practitioners can hope that this discrepancy will be
clarified by the Texas Supreme Court.
E. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY CLAIMS
First Bank v. Brumitt160 was the third iteration of this lender liability
case, which was previously reported on by these authors.161 In the prior
case,162 the Texas Supreme Court held that First Bank was not liable for
the claims from a third-party beneficiary relating to the bank’s failure to
approve and consummate a loan for the purchase of stock in an enter-
prise of the third-party beneficiary, despite certain assurances to the con-
trary.163 In that case, the supreme court remanded back to the court the
issue of whether the third-party beneficiary had negligent representation
claims. In its analysis of negligent representation claims, the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals noted that negligent representation claims
should be distinguished from breach of contract claims based upon
whether the false information was about an existing fact (a negligent mis-
representation claim) or about promises for future conduct (a breach of
contract claim).164 The court analyzed the allegations and evidence
presented by Brumitt, as the third-party beneficiary, which included the
claims related to promises by the bank about closing and funding the loan
on a future date, statements from the bank president that he would “get it
done,” and statements to the bank customer and Brumitt that they
“would be happy.”165 These facts were a representation about future per-
formance, which sounded in contract and would not support negligent
misrepresentation claims.166
F. ANTI-DEFICIENCY STATUTE OF LIMITATION WAIVER
One of the most important cases in this survey period is Godoy v. Wells
157. Id. at 275.
158. 331 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. App.—2010, no pet.).
159. Duarte-Viera, 560 S.W.3d at 275.
160. 564 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
161. J. Richard White et al., Real Property, 4 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 357, 374 (2018).
162. First Bank v. Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d 95 (Tex. 2017).
163. Id. at 111.
164. Brumitt, 564 S.W.3d at 495.
165. Id. at 494.
166. Id. at 496.
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Fargo Bank, N.A.167 The appellate court case was discussed by last year’s
authors.168 Goday resolved whether a guarantor can waive for the benefit
of the lender the two-year statute of limitations for anti-deficiency suits
against the guarantor. The provisions of the guaranty involving the waiver
under consideration, in relevant part, read:
Guarantor also waives any and all rights or defenses arising by rea-
son of (A) any “one action” or “anti-deficiency” law or any other law
which may prevent Lender from bringing any action, including a
claim for deficiency, against Guarantor, before or after Lender’s
commencement or completion of any foreclosure action, either judi-
cially or by exercise of a power of sale; . . . (E) any statute of limita-
tions, if at any time any action or suit brought by Lender against
Guarantor is commenced, there is outstanding indebtedness of Bor-
rower to Lender which is not barred by any applicable statute of
limitations; or (F) any defenses given to guarantors at law or in eq-
uity other than actual payment and performance of the Indebtedness
. . . .169
After resolving procedural issues, the Texas Supreme Court addressed
the substance of the waiver issue. As a basis for the ruling in this and the
underlying decisions, the supreme court approved its prior holding that
“[i]t appears to be well settled that an agreement in advance to waive or
not plead the statutes of limitation is void as against public policy.”170
Further, the supreme court approved the modifications made by the
Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals that waivers of statutes of limita-
tions are void unless the waiver is “specific and for a reasonable time.”171
Stated differently, the supreme court held: “Blanket pre-dispute waivers
of all statutes of limitation are unenforceable, but waivers of a particular
limitations period for a defined and reasonable amount of time may be
enforced.”172
Analyzing the subject guaranty, the supreme court concluded that
clauses (E) and (F) were both unenforceable because each attempted to
completely waive all limitations periods, and as such, they were neither
specific nor reasonable as to the limitation waiver.173 In clause (A), the
supreme court found the language specific (being the waiver of only the
two-year limitation for bringing anti-deficiency suits).174 But, the waiver
time requirement was not so clear because there was no substitute limita-
tion period and no specific end date.175 Such provision might, absent
167. 575 S.W.3d 531, (Tex. 2019).
168. J. Richard White et al., Real Property, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 317, 334 (2019).
169. Godoy, 575 S.W.3d at 533–34.
170. Id. at 537 (citing Simpson v. McDonald, 179 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1944)).
171. Id. at 537–38 (first citing Am. Alloy Steel, Inc. v. Armco, Inc., 777 S.W.2d at 177
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.); then citing Duncan v. Lisenby, 912
S.W.2d at 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.); then citing Titus v. Wells
Fargo Bank Union & Tr. Co., 134 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1943)).
172. Id. at 538.
173. Id. at 539.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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other factors, make the provision unenforceable; however, the supreme
court concluded such provision was rehabilitated by operation of law be-
cause (1) the four-year limitation period under Texas Civil Practice &
Remedy Code Section 16.004(a)(3)176 also applied to collection of debts,
which alone would satisfy the reasonable time requirement;177 and (2) of
the applicability and operation of the guaranty’s savings clause, which
read, in relevant part, as follows: “[I]f any such waiver is determined to
be contrary to any applicable law or public policy, such waiver shall be
effective only to the extent permitted by law or public policy.”178 There-
fore, the four-year limitation on collection of debts and the savings clause
caused the clause (A) waiver to be for a reasonable time and not a viola-
tion of public policy waiver doctrine and was, therefore, enforceable.179
In dicta, the supreme court noted that clause (E) could also have been
rehabilitated under the savings clause, but did not reach that conclusion
as it was unnecessary.180
Practitioners should take note of the language required for waivers of
limitation periods to be enforceable. First, it must be specific. Second, it
must have a reasonable time period. And third, although not a require-
ment, it should be accompanied by a contractual savings clause limiting
enforcement to the extent allowed by applicable law and public policy.
G. INDEMNITY – ADVANCEMENT
L Series, L.L.C. v. Holt181 involved the interpretation of an advance-
ment provision under an indemnity clause. Holt was the general manager
of numerous car dealerships, and was also a member of each of the lim-
ited liability companies that owned the dealerships. Each of the limited
liability company agreements contained an indemnity provision that, in
relevant part, defined a person entitled to indemnification as a covered
person “serving at the request of the Company and an officer, trustee,
employee, agent, or similar functionary of the Company[.]”182 The right
to indemnification, covered in a second provision, included a required
payment or reimbursement to a covered person “who was, is or is
threatened to be made a named defendant or respondent in a Proceeding
[1] in advance of the final disposition of the Proceeding and [2] without
any determination as to the [Covered] Person’s ultimate entitlement to in-
demnification . . . .”183 The limited liability companies dismissed Holt for
various types of financial fraud (such as booking fraudulent car sales) and
sued Holt based on such action. Holt requested advancement of his legal
fees and expenses under the indemnification clause. In its analysis, the
176. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(3).
177. Godoy, 575 S.W.3d at 539.
178. Id. at 534.
179. Id. at 539–40.
180. Id. at 540 n.2.
181. 571 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied).
182. Id. at 874.
183. Id. at 873.
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Second Fort Worth Court of Apppeals approved a Delaware court’s
statement that “the right to indemnification and advancement are correl-
ative, they are separate and distinct legal actions. The right to advance-
ment is not dependent on the right to indemnification.”184 The court
remarked how Delaware had come to grips with enforcement of indemni-
fication and advancement clauses even in the case of serious miscon-
duct,185 and had chastised the lack of “carefully draft[ed] and narrowly
tailor[ed] advancement rights[.]”186 Therefore, and following Delaware
law, the court dismissed the companies’ arguments that Holt’s actions
were not within the scope of his employment and were irrelevant as to
the advancement provision.187 The court also held that Holt could en-
force the advancement provision by specific performance, since failing to
do so would “eviscerate the right for which he and the Companies
bargained.”188
H. INDEMNITY – FAIR NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Banta Oilfield Services. v. Mewbourne Oil Co.189 involved the interpre-
tation of an indemnity clause under a master services agreement relating
to oil well operations. Mewbourne owned oil and gas properties in New
Mexico and hired Banta Oilfield to perform services at the site. A 300-
gallon battery tank was to be installed at the site by Banta, and
Mewbourne contracted with Steve Kent Trucking and C&M Services for
additional work in that regard. In moving the tank, Vargas, an employee
of either Kent Trucking or C&M Services, was injured when the tank
slipped off the chain while it was being moved by a Banta owned and
operated truck. After addressing numerous procedural and choice of law
issues, the Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed the substance of
the indemnity provision, which read, in applicable part, as follows: “THE
ASSUMPTIONS OF LIABILITY, RELEASES, AND INDEMNITIES
SET FORTH IN THIS ARTICLE 5 SHALL APPLY TO ANY CLAIMS
WITHOUT REGARD TO THE CAUSES THEREOF . . . OR THE
NEGLIGENCE OF ANY PERSON OR PARTY, INCLUDING THE
INDEMNIFIED PARTY OR PARTIES . . . .”190
In discussing the enforceability of this provision, the court considered
whether the provision complied with the Texas Fair Notice Requirements,
which consist of two parts: (1) the express negligence doctrine; and (2)
the conspicuousness doctrine.191 The plain language of the Master Ser-
vices Agreement (quoted above) specified that the parties intended
184. Id. at 870 (quoting Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 212 (Del. 2005)).
185. Id. at 875; Homestore, 888 A.2d at 213–14.
186. Holt, 571 S.W.3d at 875; Barrett v. Am. Country Holdings, Inc., 951 A.2d 735, 737
(Del. Ch. 2008).
187. Holt, 571 S.W.3d at 876.
188. Id. at 879.
189. 568 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. denied).
190. Id. at 714–15.
191. Id. at 714.
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Mewbourne to indemnify Banta, based on the phrases “without regard to
the causes thereof” and “without regard to . . . the negligence of any
person or party, including the indemnified party.”192 That satisfied the
express negligence doctrine.193 As to the conspicuousness requirement,
the document was seven pages of single spaced, lower case, and unbolded
text and the indemnity provision was capital letters and boldfaced type;
that satisfied the conspicuousness doctrine requirements.194
I. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT
DeRoeck v. DHM Ventures, LLC195 involved an acknowledgment of a
debt otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. In this case, DeRoeck
QTIP Trust (the Trust) made a loan to DHM Ventures, LLC, which loan
was guaranteed by Moritz and Halsey. DHM failed to pay the debt and
the Trust sued the debtor and the guarantors on the debt. But such suit
was filed after the alleged expiration of the four-year statute of limitation.
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the debtor, which
was appealed in a prior action and affirmed.196 However, the Texas Su-
preme Court reversed the Third Austin Court of Appeals’ finding that the
Trust had sufficiently pled acknowledgment of the debt and remanded it
back for further consideration.197 Therefore, in the current case, the
Third Austin Court of Appeals looked at the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by the Trust to sustain its acknowledgment claim.
To evidence the debt of DHM, the Trust presented checks drawn on
DHM’s account which were payable to the Trust, dated within the four-
year limitation period, and contained a notation in the memo section in-
dicating “interest.”198 Considering the sufficiency of this evidence, the
court of appeals cited numerous Texas cases holding that a check was a
sufficient written acknowledgment of a debt and avoided the limitations
trap.199 However, Texas law of acknowledgement does provide an excep-
tion if a check is accompanied by any circumstance negating the presump-
tion of willingness or intention to pay.200 The record was absent any
evidence of an unwillingness to pay the debt.201 Consequently, the checks
were sufficient evidence of material facts to justify denial of DHM’s sum-
mary judgment motion.202
192. Id. at 714–15.
193. Id. at 715.
194. Id. at 715–16.
195. 576 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.).
196. DeRoeck v. DHM Ventures, LLC, No. 03-15-00713-CV, 2016 WL 4270000 (Tex.
App.—Austin Aug. 9, 2016) (mem. op.), rev’d, 556 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 2018).
197. DeRoeck v. DHM Ventures, LLC, 556 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 2018) (specifying the ac-
knowledgment elements were: (1) a writing signed by the debtor; (2) an unequivocal ac-
knowledgement of the justness or evidence of the debt; and (3) an expression of a
willingness to honor the debt).
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Also, the two individual guarantors asserted limitations against their
guarantee of the debt. The court reviewed whether the guarantors had
acknowledged their obligations to pay prior to the expiration of limita-
tion period.203 The guaranty instrument had some ambiguity in the lan-
guage, but the court harmonized the language in Sections 2 and 4. Section
2 of the guaranty provided that the guarantors “shall, immediately upon
demand by Lender, pay the amount due on the Guaranteed Indebtedness
to Lender[.]”204 On the other hand, Section 4 provided: “[i]n the event of
default in payment or performance of the Guaranteed Obligations . . .
Guarantor shall promptly pay the amount due thereon to Lender without
notice or demand, of any kind or nature. . . .”205 In harmonizing these two
seemingly conflicting provisions, the court interpreted them to mean that
the guarantors were liable on the debt “immediately” upon maturity, but
were only required to “promptly” pay in the event of a default without
demand.206 Practitioners should pay attention to any such conflicting pro-
visions and consider their impact upon litigation; the best practice, of
course, is to verify that no conflicting provisions are included in the
documentation.
As to the substance of the acknowledgment by the guarantors, the
Trust introduced two emails, one from Halsey and one from Moritz. The
Halsey email, dated August 29, 2012, was to Moritz, indicating that Hal-
sey would cover “this month’s interest, and . . . I can cover the interest for
balance of the year.”207 In the Moritz email, dated September 17, 2013,
Moritz asked for verification of “interest . . . owed until 8/31/13 and then
the interest that will be due 9/30/13.”208 It also continued with a state-
ment that: “I would like to send in the interest . . . .”209 These emails were
determined to be in writing and signed, and acknowledged the existence
of the DHM debt and the guarantors’ intent to pay the debt.210 Analyzing
whether these emails were on behalf of the individual guarantors or the
company, the court of appeals determined that the emails were from Mo-
ritz and Halsey in their individual capacities as guarantors and not as of-
ficers or representatives of DHM.211 Consequently, the emails
represented sufficient evidence of the guarantors’ acknowledgment of the
debt to avoid the summary judgment in their favor.212
J. OUTSIDER REVERSE VEIL-PIERCING; FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
Yamin v. Carroll Wayne Conn, L.P.213 involved a reverse piercing of
203. Id. at 879.
204. Id. at 879 n.7.
205. Id.
206. Id.





212. Id. at 881.
213. 574 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
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the corporate veil argument, coupled with fraudulent transfer issues. Ste-
phen Yamin had guaranteed a lease obligation for his son, and ultimately
suffered a judgment on such guaranty. The guaranty was issued in 2004
and the judgment obtained in 2010. In 2006, at a time when Stephen and
Mary Ann Yamin were insolvent and being supported by their daughter,
Maryann formed Texas Black Iron, Inc. and its ownership was evidenced
by a sole stock certificate in the name of Mary Ann, as her “sole and
separate property.” Nevertheless, evidence showed that the business of
Black Iron was run solely by the husband, Stephen, and Mary Ann had
virtually no knowledge of its business activities, and no actual involve-
ment in the business. In addition to the stock certificate characterization
as separate property, the husband and wife executed a bill of sale which
purported to transfer the husband’s interest in Texas Black Iron to the
wife as her sole and separate property. In 2013, the husband and wife
entered into a partition/stipulation agreement which reallocated the hus-
band’s interest in Texas Black Iron to the wife, but also included the
transfer of numerous other community property assets (excepting only a
few assets held by the husband). To recover its judgment debt, the land-
lord creditor, Carroll Wayne Conn, L.P. sued Stephen, Maryann, and
Texas Black Iron, alleging fraudulent transfers under Texas Family Code
Section 4.106(a),214 the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(TUFTA),215 and under a theory of outsider reverse-piercing of the cor-
porate veil.216
Reverse veil-piercing was defined to be where a corporation is liable
for a shareholder’s debts, which is the opposite of direct veil-piercing in
which the shareholder is held liable for the debts of the corporation.217
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals recognized prior decisions up-
holding reverse veil-piercing which relied upon traditional veil-piercing
theories.218 However, the court held that the “legislature has now pre-
empted the common law regarding traditional veil-piercing, but it has not
addressed reverse veil-piercing, which continues to be a common-law
doctrine.”219 Also, the court distinguished between insider and outsider
reverse veil-piercing, quoting from a commentator on reverse veil-pierc-
ing220 that defined insider reverse veil-piercing as involving a “dominant
shareholder or other controlling insider who attempts to have the corpo-
rate entity disregarded” for his benefit and an outsider reverse veil-pierc-
ing as involving a third-party claimant who sues a corporate insider to
214. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.106(a).
215. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001–.013.
216. Yamin, 574 S.W.3d at 54–55.
217. Id. at 66.
218. Id. at 67 (citing Richard Nugent & CAO, Inc. v. Estate of Ellickson, 543 S.W.3d
243 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (first citing SSP Partners v. Gladstrong
Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2008); then citing Castleberry v. Branscum, 721
S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986))).
219. Id.; see TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 21.223–.225.
220. Yamin, 574 S.W.3d at 66 n.13.
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pierce the corporate veil for the third party’s benefit.221
Next, the court considered whether the veil-piercing statute applied to
reverse veil-piercing. The applicable statute read as follows:
The liability of a holder, beneficial owner, or subscriber of shares of
a corporation, or any affiliate of such a holder, owner, or subscriber
or of the corporation, for an obligation that is limited by Section
21.223 is exclusive and preempts any other liability imposed for that
obligation under common law or otherwise.222
The obligations referred to in that statute are for, inter alia, “contractual
obligation[s] of the corporation . . . on the basis that the [owner] . . . was
the alter ego of the corporation or on the basis of actual or constructive
fraud[.]”223 Reasoning that Section 21.223 limits liability “to the corpora-
tion or its obligees” for contractual obligations of the corporation, then
reverse veil-piercing does not fit within this statutory framework and was
inapplicable to the subject case.224 Despite such ruling, common law the-
ories of outsider reverse veil-piercing were still applicable. Although the
Black Iron shares were in Mary Ann’s name, the court of appeals deter-
mined the shares to be community property and, therefore, Stephen and
Mary Ann both had undivided interests in the shares, making each of
them insiders and not outsiders.225 Consequently, the court specifically
stated it was not ruling on whether the outsider reverse veil-piercing was
available to a creditor of a corporate officer lacking such ownership
interest.226
However, there was a dissent from Justice Frost on the outsider reverse
veil-piercing issue. Justice Frost distinguished Nugent on the basis that
reverse veil-piercing was not asserted in such case and could not be au-
thoritative for that reason.227 The dissent continued by questioning if the
actual fraud requirement of the statute228 should be analogous for the
analysis under common law, and suggested it was a matter of first impres-
sion for Texas courts.229 The recent case Clement v. Blackwood230 was
distinguished because the jury found fraud, but the issue of the require-
ments for fraud was not addressed by either of the parties.231 The major-
ity had rejected Black Iron’s argument that actual fraud should be an
element of outsider reverse veil-piercing, but Justice Frost reasoned that
221. Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards,
16 J. CORP. L. 33, 37 (1990).
222. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 21.224.
223. Id. § 21.223(a)(2).
224. Yamin, 574 S.W.3d at 68 (emphasis removed).
225. Id. at 69.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 72.
228. Id.; see TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (stating that “Section (a)(2) does
not prevent or limit the liability of [an owner] . . . [for] actual fraud on the obligee prima-
rily for the direct personal benefit of the [owner].”).
229. Yamin, 574 S.W.3d at 72.
230. No. 11-16-00087-CV, 2018 WL 826856 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 8, 2018, pet. de-
nied) (mem. op.).
231. Yamin, 574 S.W.3d at 72.
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in the absence of any legislative mandate for fraud, actual fraud should be
a necessary element of the common law outsider reverse veil-piercing
theory based on principles of consistency and equity.232
With such dissent, and the fact that the Texas Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue, practitioners should not assume that the viability and
elements for an outsider reverse veil-piercing theory were established by
the Yamin court. Perhaps the supreme court or legislature will take ac-
tion on this issue to provide clarification.
K. SATISFACTION OF DEBT
In West v. Quintanilla,233 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether
the parol evidence rule was applicable to documentation relating to
whether a debt had been extinguished or satisfied. Of course, as with
most parol evidence rule cases, the issues here could have been avoided
by more careful drafting of the documentation. There were basically
three agreements: (1) a 2014 Trading Agreement; (2) a 2015 Purchase
Agreement; and (3) an oral March 2015 Sale Agreement. Under the
Trading Agreement, West was given $5 million to trade commodities,
which he did well for a number of years, but ultimately resulted in a $14
million loss; the two other documents were a “workout” of this loss. The
Purchase Agreement provided for the sale of certain assets from West to
Quintanilla, which included an “entire agreement” clause. The oral Sale
Agreement provided that (1) West would convey to Quintanilla assets of
West worth $7 million; (2) Quintanilla could claim all of the $14 million
trading losses for a $3 million tax benefit; and (3) a sale of West’s prop-
erty at a price that was $4.3 million less than fair market value. These
three actions would have covered the $14 million loss under the Trading
Agreement. Quintanilla sued West claiming that West had not satisfied
the debt obligations under the Trading Agreement, and asserted that the
parol evidence rule prevented West from providing evidence of the na-
ture of the Sale Agreement. The trial court allowed entry of such “parol
evidence”; the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed, and here
the supreme court reversed and remanded. By the nature of this appeal,
the issue was only whether West had provided prima facie evidence of the
essential elements of his claims for slander of title and fraudulent lien
claims against Quintanilla.
In discussing the parol evidence rule, the supreme court highlighted the
difference between the parol evidence rule and the contract construction
rule “that bars consideration of parol evidence to modify or add to [an]
unambiguous written [contract].”234 When there is a “valid, written, inte-
grated contract, the parol evidence rule precludes enforcement of any
prior or contemporaneous agreement” which is inconsistent with the sub-
232. Id. at 73.
233. 573 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2019).
234. Id. at 243 n.11.
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ject matter of the written contract.235 In fact, the parol evidence rule is a
substantive rule of law, not a rule of evidence; therefore, it is not depen-
dent upon whether the alleged agreement is oral or written, but whether
the oral agreement is inconsistent with the written agreement.236
Quintanilla alleged that the Purchase Agreement and Sale Agreement
were done contemporaneously and, therefore, the Sale Agreement was
barred by the parol evidence rule, but the supreme court held the Sale
Agreement was not barred by the parol evidence rule because it was “col-
lateral to and consistent with” the Purchase Agreement.237
In analyzing the Purchase Agreement, the supreme court discussed “in-
tegrated contracts”238 and the “entire agreement” provision. The su-
preme court construed the Purchase Agreement as a partially integrated
contract,239 which did not cover all agreements of the parties and did not
supersede the Sale Agreement.240 In this regard, the supreme court found
the “entire agreement” provision was final and complete only as to the
terms in the Purchase Agreement, and that it did not “purport to address
or supersede agreements related to other matters.”241 The supreme court
construed the Purchase Agreement narrowly as relating to the purchase
and sale of the assets covered thereby,242 and construed the Sale Agree-
ment as being a collateral contract which was not inconsistent with the
Purchase Agreement.243 The oral Sale Agreement related to the satisfac-
tion of the debt accrued under the Trading Agreement and the Purchase
Agreement related solely to the details and complexities of the acquisi-
tion of assets of West by Quintanilla.244 Consequently, the oral Sale
Agreement was a collateral agreement and not inconsistent with the
Purchase Agreement.245 Therefore, West had provided at least the prima
facie evidence of the essential elements of his cause of action and the case
was remanded for final hearing on the sufficiency of such evidence.246
The lesson to be learned from this case is the proper drafting of docu-
ments in the original transaction. If the Purchase Agreement and Sale
235. Id. at 243.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 244.
238. Id. (relying on Integrated Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), to
explain an integrated contract as one or more writings which cover all terms of an agree-
ment between the parties, which is sometimes called a “partially” integrated contract, as






243. Id. at 245.
244. Id. at 248.
245. Id. at 245. The court viewed its holding as consistent with Swinnea v. ERI Consult-
ing Engineers, Inc., 236 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 318
S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2010), and Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 317 S.W.2d 30 (1958), holding
that the oral agreement related to the written documents which addressed related subject
matters, but did not contradict the written agreements and was not inconsistent.
246. West, 573 S.W.3d at 248.
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Agreement had been a single document, all of the issues in this case
would have been avoided.
IV. LANDLORD–TENANT RELATIONSHIP/LEASES
A. LANDLORD–TENANT RELATIONSHIP
In St. Anthony’s Minor Emergency Center, L.L.C. v. Ross Nicolson
2000 Separate Property Trust,247 the Fourteenth Houston Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a case in-
volving the lockout of a sublessee by a lessor.248 The facts of this case are
straightforward: the sublessee had been paying rent to the sublessor but
the sublessor had not been paying the rent to the lessor. The terms of the
lease specifically prevented the sublease of the premises without the les-
sor’s prior written consent.249 Although the lessor knew about the sub-
lease, the lessor never expressly consented to the sublease as required by
the lease. As a result, there was no privity of estate and no land-
lord–tenant relationship.250 The sublessee had no grounds to assert
wrongful lockout and constructive eviction.251 This case is a reminder to
all practitioners to ensure that the lessor has consented to a sublease or to
confirm such consent is not required per the terms of the lease between
the lessor and the lessee.
B. OPTION TO PURCHASE
In Weaver v. H.E. Lacey, Inc.,252 the Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals
examined whether language in a lease granted a tenant a right of first
refusal, which would survive termination of the lease, or an option to
purchase which would expire upon termination of the lease. The landlord,
Lacey, and the tenant, Weaver, entered into a one-year lease in February
1998. The lease contained the following language, “During the one-year
lease, MR. WEAVER will have first option of refusal for ONE HUN-
DRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($175,000.00).”253
The tenant and the landlord entered into an earnest money contract on
December 7, 1998.254 For a variety of reasons not relevant to the court’s
holding, the purchase was never finalized. Nevertheless, the tenant re-
mained on the property until 2016. Unfortunately for Weaver, the parties
never entered into a new lease which resulted in Weaver being a holdover
tenant for over seventeen years. In 2016, the landlord received a purchase
offer from a third party for $225,000.00.255 The landlord sent a letter to
the tenant giving the tenant the opportunity to purchase the property at
247. 567 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
248. Id. at 796.
249. Id. at 795.
250. Id. at 800.
251. Id.
252. 562 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. denied).
253. Id. at 119.
254. Id. at 116.
255. Id. at 118.
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the same price.256 The tenant refused and the landlord eventually filed a
declaratory judgment action.257 The tenant maintained that the terms of
the lease extended into the holdover tenancy and the tenant still had an
option to purchase the property for $175,000.00. The trial court found
that the language created an option to purchase which was not properly
exercised during the one-year period and, therefore, was no longer
valid.258 As the court of appeals stated, “The law requires strict compli-
ance with the terms of an option contract.”259 Furthermore, once the par-
ties entered into the purchase agreement, the tenancy was terminated.260
C. TERMINATION OF LEASE/DAMAGES/ATTORNEY’S FEES/HOLDOVER
Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP261 was a case that
wound its way through the Texas court system for many years until it was
ultimately settled by the Texas Supreme Court. The case dealt with
whether a tenant can terminate a commercial lease for a landlord’s
breach of express lease covenants. The facts are straightforward:
Rohrmoos Ventures leased a building to UTSW DVA Healthcare
(UTSW) for use as a dialysis center. UTSW began experiencing moisture
issues in 2007 and was ultimately cited by state health inspectors with
respect to the moisture issues. Despite Rohrmoos’s efforts to fix the is-
sues, the issues continued for several years, well into 2009.262 UTSW fi-
nally terminated its lease early with over $250,000.00 in rent allegedly still
owing to the landlord.263 The lease expressly allowed for damages for
breach and did not contain an express termination clause.264 UTSW sued
Rohrmoos for breach of contract and breach of the implied warranty of
suitability. The jury found that both parties failed to comply with the
lease but Rohrmoos breached the lease first and that Rohrmoos also
breached the implied warranty of suitability.265 Rohrmoos appealed and
attacked the jury’s finding that it breached the implied warranty of suita-
bility. In Texas, the implied warranty of suitability was first created by the
Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Davidow v. Inwood North Professional
Group–Phase 1.266 Rohrmoos argued that unless the implied warranty
from Davidow is expressly waived under the lease or the lease contains a
provision that superseded Davidow’s implied warranty, a tenant can only
256. Id.
257. Id. at 117.
258. Id. at 119.
259. Id. (citing Besteman v. Pitcock, 272 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008,
no pet.)); see Chambers v. Hunt Petroleum Corp., 320 S.W.3d 578, 583 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2010, no pet.).
260. Weaver, 562 S.W.3d at 119.
261. 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019).
262. Id. at 476–77.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 477.
265. Id. at 476–77.
266. 747 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. 1988) (holding that “there is an implied warranty of
suitability by the landlord in a commercial lease that the premises are suitable for their
intended commercial purpose.”).
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terminate a commercial lease by proving a breach of the implied warranty
of suitability and not for a material breach of the express duty to repair.
Rohrmoos further argued that under the Davidow holding the proper
remedy for breach of an express duty, such as the duty to repair, is dam-
ages unless there is an express provision to the contrary permitting an
alternative remedy such as termination. The supreme court disagreed
with Rohrmoos’s interpretation of the Davidow holding, finding that
while Davidow expressly dealt only with the remedy for the breach of the
implied warranty, the holding should not be read to imply that the same
remedy was not available for other breaches.267
At first glance, the supreme court’s analysis in Rohrmoos seems to be a
natural extension of Davidow and does not seem particularly troubling.
However, when the case is read in connection with another Texas Su-
preme Court case, Regency Advantage Ltd. Partnership v. Bingo
Idea–Watauga, Inc.,268 one’s perception of the significance of the holding
dramatically changes, particularly if one is a lender and investor, or a
practitioner representing either. In Regency, the supreme court, relying
on Restatement (Second) Property Section 16 comment. h, held that a
tenant may elect to terminate a lease for landlord default or have a de-
fense to the obligation to pay rent even if the default occurred prior to the
lease being assigned to a new landlord/property owner.269 When read col-
lectively, the message from these cases for practitioners who advise cli-
ents buying portfolios of leased properties is threefold: (1) do not find
comfort in the absence of a “termination cause”; (2) buyer beware; and
(3) think twice before waiving tenant estoppels for larger, important
leases. Furthermore, real estate practitioners should carefully ponder the
value of negotiating termination options out of leases versus making the
option very difficult to exercise.
Tuttle v. Builes270 involved a commercial tenant holding over after the
expiration of its lease and provides the practitioner not only a good re-
view on the rights and remedies against tenants at sufferance versus te-
nants at will (and the appropriate damage award in each scenario), but
also presents several cautionary tales—one on proper lease drafting and
one on enforcement of remedies. Counsel in this case made a crucial mis-
take sending a termination notice for a defaulted lease when they should
have merely sent a notice of default. The facts of the case are straightfor-
ward: in January 2007, Xenco signed a five-year lease with Tuttle which
expired December 31, 2011. The parties also signed a separate option to
lease that was only applicable during the lease term. In May 2010, the
parties superseded the old lease and entered into a new lease reflecting a
revised rental payment. The new lease contained the following holdover
provision:
267. Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 483.
268. 936 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. 1996).
269. Id. at 277–78.
270. 572 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.).
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Any holding over after the expiration of this lease, with Landlord’s
consent, shall be construed to be a tenancy from month to month,
cancellable upon thirty (30) days written notice, and at a minimum
rental of TWO HUNDRED PERCENT (200%) of the minimum
rental, and upon the terms that existed during the last year of the
term of this lease.271
Xenco sent notice of intent to exercise the option to purchase, which
was received by Tuttle on December 23, 2011. Tuttle never responded to
Xenco’s letter. After the lease terminated on December 31, Xenco con-
tinued to attempt to negotiate the purchase of the property, but failed to
make regular monthly rental payments with the exception of one pay-
ment of $6,000.00 on January 12, 2012. This rent payment was accepted
by Tuttle. In March, Tuttle sent Xenco two letters notifying Xenco it was
in default and terminating the lease. Despite having sent two letters ter-
minating the lease, Tuttle maintained Xenco was a holdover tenant at will
and owed holdover rent of 200% as well as late fees totaling over
$4,211,975.00. Tuttle argued that Xenco was a tenant at will because
Xenco made and Tuttle accepted one rental payment after the natural
expiration of the lease but BEFORE Tuttle sent the letter of termination.
The monthly rental rate under the lease was $6,000.00 per month. Xenco
alleged that this rental rate was well above market and was actually an
installment purchase contract. According to Xenco, the parties had
agreed that the reasonable rental rate was $1,200.00 a month and the ad-
ditional $3,800.00 per month was part of the purchase agreement. Fur-
thermore, Xenco alleged it was a tenant at sufferance despite the fact that
it had paid one month’s rent after the natural termination of the lease.
Xenco’s position was that the payment was a “good faith” payment to-
wards the purchase of the property.272 The trial court held Xenco was a
tenant at sufferance and that Tuttle was only entitled to reasonable value
of rent per month, which they determined to be $1,200.00 with a total
amount of unpaid rent owing equal to $63,000.00.273 The Eleventh East-
land Court of Appeals stated clearly that acceptance of a one-time partial
payment of rent “does not automatically create a tenancy at will”274 and
found Xenco to be a tenant at sufferance.275 The appropriate measure of
damages for a tenancy at sufferance was reasonable rental value.276 The
difference in this case was over four million dollars, a very expensive mis-
take for the practitioner and the landlord.
271. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
272. Id at 352.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 354 (citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Inducto-Bend, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 651,
654 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (applying Texas law)).
275. Id. at 354–55.
276. Id. at 358.
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D. JURISDICTION OF THE JUSTICE COURTS
It seems a yearly ritual that plaintiffs feel compelled to challenge the
jurisdiction of the justice courts over issues of forcible entry and detainer.
Mendoza v. Bazan277 is worth mentioning here because it involved sev-
eral slightly different twists on the normal facts and provides a useful
refresher to the practitioner. Mendoza involved a landlord, whose title in
the property was questioned, bringing both a forcible detainer action and
a suit for unpaid rent. The tenant argued the suit was in excess of the
jurisdictional limit of the justice court of $10,000.00. As most practitioners
are aware, pursuant to Section 27.031(a)(1) and (2) of the Texas Govern-
ment Code, the justice court clearly has jurisdiction over cases with an
amount in controversy less than $10,000.00 and over all cases involving
forcible entry and detainer.278 Although the holding of the Eighth El
Paso Court of Appeals is not as plainly stated as one would like because
the court fails to definitively address several important issues (such as
whether the justice court has jurisdiction over forcible detainer actions
involving amounts in excess of $10,000.00), these authors feel that the
court rightfully found that the justice court had jurisdiction over the pre-
sent case. The court of appeals also addressed the issue of whether the
justice court had the right to decide a forcible detainer case where there
was a question as to the title of the landlord. The details needed to clearly
analyze the issue are missing from the court’s holding and are, therefore,
not addressed in this article. Nonetheless, the authors do wish to point
out to practitioners that although the tenant was essentially a holdover
tenant, the legal title of the landlord to the property was, for a period of
time, in question. The court held that the fact that the landlord’s legal
title was in question was irrelevant in a forcible detainer action because
“a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show
sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to imme-
diate possession.”279
Another unique aspect of the Mendoza case is that this was the second
forcible detainer action brought by the landlord. The first forcible de-
tainer action had been decided against the landlord. The tenant claimed
res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the present case. However, as
has been well established in Texas courts over the years, a forcible de-
tainer action is “uniquely limited in time” to the party that has the right
to superior possession at the time the case is brought.280 Or, more explic-
itly “an award of possession on a particular date does not determine a
party’s possessory interests on a future date[.]”281
277. 574 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet denied).
278. Id. at 601; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(1)–(2).
279. Mendoza, 574 S.W.3d at 602 (citing Molinar v. Refaei, No. 08-14-00299-CV, 2016
WL 5121988, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 21, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Rice
v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.))).
280. Id. at 605 (citing Puentes v. Fannie Mae, 350 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2011, pet. dism’d)).
281. Id.
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In yet another forcible detainer action—Sloane v. Goldberg B’Nai
B’rith Towers282—the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals addressed
the circumstances under which a landlord has the right to possession
under a forcible detainer action for a lease that was terminated for a rea-
son other than non-payment, as is the normal circumstance in forcible
detainer cases, but instead for alleged violations of the “House Rules” by
the tenant and other lease terms. In the case at hand, the tenant was
alleged to have threatened other tenants, including threatening to shoot
management (which the tenant alleged was only a joke) and repeatedly
used vulgar and disparaging words when talking to management or other
tenants. Ultimately, after multiple incidents over several years, the land-
lord sent the tenant a letter of termination. The tenant argued an affirma-
tive defense that his breach of the lease and the “House Rules” were
excused because of prior material breaches by the landlord of the lease
and the failure of the landlord to enforce the “House Rules” for other
tenants. The case law in Texas is clear that although further performance
of a contract is generally excused after a breach by one party, “[w]hen a
party treats a contract as continuing despite the other party’s prior
breach, the party may not rely on prior material breach to excuse his own
performance.”283 The lease stated that “[w]henever the Landlord has
been in material noncompliance with this Agreement, the Tenant may in
accordance with State law terminate this Agreement by so advising the
Landlord in writing.”284 As a result, the court of appeals held that “[a]
landlord is entitled to possession under a forcible detainer action when
the landlord lawfully terminates a tenant’s lease.”285 Although the court
acknowledged, in a footnote, that the tenant arguably had some valid
concerns and complaints about accessibility issues, the only valid issue in
a forcible detainer action is superior right of possession and the only dis-




In Texas Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson,287 the trial court and
Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals found that the holder of the execu-
tive rights for mineral interests owed a fiduciary duty to the non-execu-
tive interest holders and awarded the non-executive mineral interest
282. 577 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no. pet.).
283. Id. (citing Long Trs. v. Griffin, 222 S.W.3d 412, 415–16 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)
(holding that a party “who elects to treat a contract as continuing deprives himself of any
excuse for ceasing performance on his own part.”)).
284. Id. at 618.
285. Id. at 617 (first citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002; then citing Moon v. Spring
Creek Apartments, 11 S.W.3d 427, 435 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no. pet.)).
286. Id. at 617 n.8.
287. 572 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. 2019).
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holders monetary damages for breach of the fiduciary duty.288 The issu-
ance of holding was recently affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court al-
though these authors feel the supreme court’s holding creates more
questions than answers. As discussed in last year’s article as well, given
the facts of the case, explained in more detail below, the outcome
reached by the supreme court seems to be the right answer from an eq-
uity standpoint, however, arguably the holding will dramatically impact
existing business practices of executive rights holders in the state of
Texas. Given the lack of clear direction from the Texas Supreme Court, it
will also, almost undoubtedly, open the floodgates to future litigation
over whether the executive rights holders breached their “fiduciary
duty.”
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward: the Carter family
sold the surface estate and the executive rights to Texas Outfitters while
retaining the majority of the mineral interest.289 The transaction was par-
tially seller financed.290 Texas Outfitters then received multiple seemingly
competitive offers to lease the mineral interests that it turned down.291
The Carter family attempted to negotiate with Texas Outfitters, but Texas
Outfitters refused to enter into a lease unless the Carters made a number
of concessions, including, but not limited to, giving up substantially more
of their mineral interests, agreeing to non-market surface restrictions, and
reducing the outstanding indebtedness on the seller financed promissory
note.292 Ultimately, the Carter family sued Texas Outfitters293 seeking to
compel a lease of the mineral interests. The holding by the San Antonio
Court of Appeals, affirmed in part by the Texas Supreme Court, that
Texas Outfitters breached their fiduciary duty, relied on a long line of
Texas Supreme Court cases that have held that “the executive owes other
owners of the mineral interest a duty of ‘utmost fair dealing.’”294
The holding in Lesley v. Veterans Land Board of Texas295 is one of the
seminal Texas Supreme Court cases relied upon by the court of appeals in
their holding. In Lesley, the supreme court applied the “fiduciary duty”
standard to the refusal of an executive owner to lease property “[i]f the
refusal [to lease] is arbitrary or motivated by self- interest to the non-
executive’s detriment.”296 Interestingly, in recent years the supreme court
has qualified this precedent to clarify that although the duty is “fiduciary
in nature” it does not require one to “place the interest of the other party
288. Tex. Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, 534 S.W.3d 65, 66 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2018, pet. granted), aff’d 572 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. 2019).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 69.
292. Id. at 70.
293. Id.
294. Id. (citing Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 480–81 (Tex.
2011)).
295. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 480–81.
296. Id. at 491.
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before [its] own.”297 The supreme court stuck to this fine line with its
holding in Texas Outfitters stating that “we cannot and do not say that an
executive primarily interested in the surface necessarily breaches his duty
by engaging in conduct that benefits the surface but not the mineral es-
tate” while simultaneously finding that under the circumstances
presented in the case at hand, Texas Outfitters had, in fact, breached its
duty.298 Although the authors agree with the holding, they cannot help
but be disappointed in the failure of the supreme court to issue unequivo-
cal guidance. Instead, once again, the supreme court has created uncer-
tainty for businesses across Texas, and likely increased litigation, by
adopting a “we know it when we see it approach” as opposed to giving
clear guidance for executive rights holders to follow.
B. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Following the trend in recent years, Copano Energy, LLC v.
Bujnoch299 is another interesting Texas Supreme Court case that these
author find, like Texas Outfitters, does more to confuse than clarify issues.
Practitioners throughout Texas had their fingers (and toes) crossed in the
hope that the supreme court would settle a current split among the vari-
ous appeals courts regarding what type of “electronic” signatures are suf-
ficient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. Various appeals
courts in Texas have found the following actions both do (or do not—
depending on the court) comply with the statute of frauds: (1) entering
your name in the e-mail from field; (2) sending an e-mail with an auto-
matically generated signature block; or (3) typing your name at the end of
the e-mail.
In the case at hand, the parties exchanged a series of e-mails about a
new easement. The various e-mails covered issues such as the price, the
location, and the parties. The emails were exchanged between the lawyer
for the property owners, Marcus Schwartz, and the Director of Right-
Away Services, James Sanford, for the energy company, Copano, that
wished to acquire the additional easement. On January 30, 2013, Sanford
emailed Schwartz agreeing to pay Schwartz’s “clients $70.00 per foot for
the second 24 inch line.” Sanford typed his name below his message.
Schwartz accepted the offer via email. Schwartz’s secretary then sent an
email to Sanford with a formal amendment to an existing easement incor-
porating the agreed to terms. Sanford responded to the email stating “I
am fine with these changes” and again typed his name below the message.
Following this exchange, two different Copano representatives sent two
different agreements to the property owners each containing prices far
below the amount negotiated between Sanford and Schwartz. Schwartz
emailed the offer to Sanford with a note that said “THIS IS NOT OUR
DEAL WHAT IS GOING ON?” Sanford responded with a long note
297. Id. at 490.
298. Tex. Outfitters v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 656–57 (Tex. 2019).
299. 593 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. 2020).
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assuring Schwartz that it was a mistake and their deal “still stands.” Ulti-
mately, however, Copano refused to close on the original deal and the
property owners sued. The trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the statute of frauds barred enforcement of
any agreement to purchase the second easement because: (1) the emails
may not be read together to make out a written memorandum, and no
single email contained the essential terms of the agreement; (2) even if
the emails may be read together, they omitted essential terms of the
agreement, such as (i) the identity of the parties, and (ii) a description of
the easement; (3) the e-mails contained “futuristic” language; and (4) the
parties did not agree to transact business by electronic means.300 The
Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals overturned the
trial court’s holding, finding that the elements of the statute of frauds
could be satisfied. On the issue of reading the e-mails together, the court
of appeals stated that instruments that are signed may be read together
and Sanford had signed each of the e-mails. Furthermore, the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code states in Section 322.007 that electronic signa-
tures are legally effective to bind parties provided that an electronic
symbol is used showing his “intent” to sign.301 Unfortunately, in Texas,
the courts have split on what is required to show your “intent.”302 In the
case at hand, the court felt that typing the name was sufficient evidence of
intent to be bound.303 Having disposed of the issue of electronic signa-
ture, the court of appeals quickly concluded that there was sufficient in-
formation in the emails to also establish the identity of the parties and the
location of the easement which was identified in the emails to be a “20
feet easement contiguous to the first easement[.]”304
The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals and overturned
the holding.305 The supreme court felt that there was no single writing or
even multiple writings taken together that clearly expressed the intent of
the parties to be bound.306 The supreme court described the e-mails as a
series of communications about a future meeting to be held and the terms
that the party intends to offer at the meeting and not the terms the party
actually offered.307 As the supreme court stated: “a writing that contem-
plates a contract to be made in the future does not satisfy the require-
ments of the statute of frauds.”308 The supreme court did not address the
300. See id. at 723–27.
301. Id. at 730–31.
302. Bujnoch v. Copano Energy, 581 S.W.3d 262, 271 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. granted), rev’d, 593 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. 2020).
303. Id. at 272.
304. Id. at 267, 275.
305. Copano Energy, 593 S.W.3d at 731–32.
306. Id. at 727–28.
307. Id. at 724.
308. Id. at 729 (citing Southmark Corp. v. Life Inv’rs, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir.
1988) (applying Texas law)); see Hugh Symons Grp., PLC v. Motorola, Inc., 292 F.3d 466,
470 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that “an overture to further joint discussion or ongoing negoti-
ations” is not a “binding agreement”); Columbia/HCA of Hous., Inc. v. Tea Cake French
Bakery & Tea Room, 8 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)
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signature issue because the issue was not argued on appeal.309
C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Although covered in last year’s materials, we are again covering Archer
v. Tregellas310 because the Texas Supreme Court heard oral arguments on
September 13, 2018, and issued an opinion on November 16, 2018, over-
turning the Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals’ decision. In the authors’
opinion, the supreme court’s decision overturning the holding of the
court of appeals should have been welcome news for practitioners all
over the state. As the authors stated in last year’s review, the holding of
the court of appeals was not only extremely troubling for real estate
transactional attorneys, but it also created severe uncertainty for anyone
who engages in the buying and selling of real estate. Luckily for all real
estate practitioners, and more so for all of the participants in the real
estate market, the clearly erroneous holding of the court of appeals was
reversed. The case, and its many progeny, are very long and involved, so
what follows is a condensed version of the case and the most relevant
court holdings, including the reversal by the supreme court.
At its core, the Tregellas case concerned a right of first refusal with
respect to a mineral interest. In June 2003, a warranty deed transferred
the surface of certain property located in Hansford County, Texas to the
Archer Trustees. In a separate recorded agreement, entered into simulta-
neously, the Archer Trustees were granted a right of first refusal (ROFR)
to purchase the minerals under the surface. The ROFR specifically pro-
vided that it was subordinate to mortgages and other encumbrances. Two
of the original grantors (the Farbers) sold their mineral interests on
March 28, 2007 to the Tregellases. The Archer Trustees became aware of
the sale in May 2011 and filed suit for specific performance of the ROFR
on May 5, 2011. To further complicate matters, in 2008, heirs of one of the
original grantors (the Smiths) sold their interest to the Tregellases. After
they learned of the Archer Trustee suit, the Smith transaction was re-
structured into a loan secured by a deed of trust with a note payable in
ninety days on which the Smiths never made payment. In August 2012,
the Tregellases acquired the Smith interest at a non-judicial foreclosure
sale.
Upon finding out about the foreclosure transaction, the Archer Trust-
ees amended their petition and alleged that the Tregellases “obtained the
Smith minerals by subterfuge, artifice, or device[.]”311 The trial court
granted specific performance to the Archer Trustees with respect to both
the Farber and Smith ROFR interest.312 The Tregallas put forth a number
(holding that a letter constituting the “initial starting point for the negotiations” could not
“constitute a binding written agreement”).
309. Copano Energy, 593 S.W.3d at 728 n.6.
310. 566 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. 2018) (overturning Tregallas v. Carol M. Archer Tr. No.
Three, 507 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016)).
311. Tregallas, 507 S.W.3d at 428.
312. Id. at 426.
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of arguments on appeal, but, for the sake of brevity, we will focus on the
issues most relevant to practitioners and the subject of the supreme
court’s recent opinion, specifically that the Archer Trustee’s claim for
specific performance, with respect to the Farber interest, was barred by
the statute of limitations.313 Generally, when a grantor of a ROFR sells
property in breach of a ROFR, “there is created in the holder an enforce-
able option to acquire the property according to the terms of the sale.”314
However, Section 16.004(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code requires “[a] suit for specific performance of a contract for the con-
veyance of real property must be brought no later than four years after
the cause of action accrues.”315 The appeals court held that the breach
occurred on March 28, 2007, when the Farbers sold their property to
Tregellas and that the suit for specific performance was barred because it
was filed outside the four-year statute of limitations period. The appeals
court based their holding on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in S.V. v.
R.V.,316 where the supreme court stated “a cause of action accrues when
a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not
discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet
occurred.”317
The Archer Trustees tried, unsuccessfully, to argue that with respect to
rights of first refusal, the right is “dormant” until the holder is notified of
a potential sale. The court of appeals disagreed and said that supporting
the Archer Trustee’s argument would result in profound uncertainty that
was “inconsistent with the purpose of the statutes of limitation,” which
according to the supreme court’s holding in S.V. is to “establish a point of
repose and to terminate stale claims.”318
The Archer Trustees went on to argue for application of the discovery
rule, which tolls the accrual of a cause of action until the party learns of
the injury or, through reasonable due diligence, could have learned of the
injury. The court of appeals dismissed the Archers Trustees’ arguments
and relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Cosgrove v. Cade,319
which the court argued limited application of the discovery rule to inju-
ries that are “inherently undiscoverable” and not ones that are discovera-
ble by the exercise of “reasonable diligence” such as a search of public
records, including the county clerk’s real property records or the tax
rolls.320 Furthermore, the court of appeals emphasized that the Texas Su-
preme Court has specifically held that there are only rare instances where
the discovery rule should be applied to breach of contract cases as each
313. Id. at 430; see also Archer v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d 281, 284 (Tex. 2018).
314. Tregallas, 507 S.W.3d at 430.
315. Id. (first citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(1); then citing
Gilbreath v. Steed, No. 12-11-00251-CV, 2013 WL 2146239 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 15,
2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
316. 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996).
317. Id.
318. Tregallas, 507 S.W.3d at 431–32 (citing S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 3).
319. 468 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. 2015).
320. Tregallas, 507 S.W.3d at 433 n.10.
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party to a contract is required to protect their own interests and “diligent
contracting parties should generally discover any breach during the rela-
tively long four-year limitations period.”321
In response, the Archer Trustees argued that it is well settled in Texas
that “owners of property are under no duty routinely to search the deed
records for later-filed documents impugning their title.”322 The court of
appeals distinguished the case at hand because, in the court’s opinion, the
Archer Trustees did not own the mineral interest—they only owned an
option to acquire a mineral interest, which was a contract right and not a
real property right.323 The court of appeals reversed the trial court with
respect to the Farber interest and upheld the trial court with respect to
the Smith interest.
In overturning the holding of the court of appeals, the supreme court
specifically found that
a grantor’s conveyance of property in breach of a right of first re-
fusal, where the rightholder is given no notice of the grantor’s intent
to sell or the purchase offer, is inherently undiscoverable and that
the discovery rule applies to defer accrual of the holder’s cause of
action until he knew or should have known of the injury.324
Although the supreme court (in a footnote) specifically limited its hold-
ing to the very narrow set of circumstances found in this case by stating
“[w]e limit our holding to this particular breach—conveyance with no no-
tice of the intent to sell or the existence of an offer—of this particular
type of right,” the holding is welcome news for real estate practitioners
and holders of all forms of options or rights of first refusal in the State of
Texas.325 As stated in last year’s review, the authors feel it is no exaggera-
tion to state that if the holding of the court of appeals had been upheld,
thousands (if not millions) of real estate deals across the State of Texas
would have been thrown into a state of uncertainty and chaos with hold-
ers of rights of first refusals and options denied the benefit of their bar-
gain and the rights they negotiated for (and often times paid handsomely
for) at the time the bargain was struck. With a stroke of the pen, the court
of appeals had suddenly rendered once valuable rights worth less than the
paper they were written on.
D. DUE DILIGENCE/COMPLIANCE WITH CONTRACT TERMS
In CHW-Lattas Creek, L.P. by GP Alice Lattas Creek, L.L.C. v. City of
Alice,326 a case involving a development agreement between a private
party and the City of Alice (City), the Fourth San Antonio Court of Ap-
321. Id. at 432 (citing Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam)).
322. Id. at 433.
323. Id.
324. Tregallas v. Carol M. Archer Tr. No. Three, 566 S.W.3d 281, 292 (Tex. 2018).
325. Id. at 292 n.10.
326. 565 S.W.3d 779 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. denied).
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peals examined the issue of whether a city’s activities pursuant to the
Development Agreement were governmental functions which entitled
the city to the protections of sovereign immunity or if the activities were
“proprietary functions” which were not immune.327 The essence of the
case is the nature of the services provided. The Texas Legislature has enu-
merated thirty-six “governmental and proprietary functions for the pur-
poses of determining whether immunity applies to tort claims against a
municipality.”328 One of the specifically enumerated items is develop-
ment activities authorized by Chapters 373 and 374 of the Local Govern-
ment Code.329 CHW attempted to argue that the Development
Agreement does not fall under the protections because CHW was provid-
ing services to the City. However, previously, Texas courts have consist-
ently dismissed this argument, finding that while actions performed under
a Development Agreement may bring general benefit to a city and facili-
tate the development of property owned by a private party, the “services”
are not being provided to a city per se and do not result in the waiver of
governmental immunity under Chapter 271.330 The court also addressed
the fact that the recitals of the Development Agreement specifically
stated that goods and services were being provided to the City and cited a
long list of Texas cases supporting the fact that “recitals cannot be used to
contradict the operative terms of a contract.”331 CHW made several
other interesting arguments for immunity, but the one that will be of most
interest to practitioners here is the argument that the City was estopped
from asserting immunity because the Development Agreement contained
a specific waiver of sovereign immunity.332 The City argued in response
that only the Legislature can waive immunity.333 The court of appeals
sided with the City based on a long line of Texas cases where it was held
that “[t]he general rule has been in this state that when a unit of govern-
ment is exercising its governmental powers, it is not subject to estop-
pel.”334 However, there are some very limited circumstances where
courts have found an exception to the general rule if “justice requires” in
order to prevent “manifest injustice.”335 The general rule “derives from
our structure of government, in which the interest of the individual must
at times yield to the public interest and in which the responsibility for
public policy must rest on decisions officially authorized by the govern-
327. Id. at 784–85 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(b)).
328. Id. at 787 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 13).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 788.
331. Id. at 789 (first citing Griffith Techs., Inc. v. Packers Plus Energy Servs. (USA),
Inc., No. 01-17-00097-CV, 2017 WL 6759200, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.
28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting recitals “cannot be used to contradict the operative
terms of a contract”); then citing All Metals Fabricating, Inc. v. Ramer Concrete, Inc., 338
S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.) (noting recitals “will not control a
contract’s operatives [sic] clauses unless those clauses are ambiguous.”)).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 790 (citing City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. 1970)).
335. Id.
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ment’s representatives, rather than on mistakes committed by its
agents.”336 The court held “parties who enter into an agreement with a
local governmental entity should be charged with the law regarding the
entity’s immunity and enter into the agreement at the parties’ own
peril.”337 The conclusion of this case is a cautionary tale for all practition-
ers that negotiate governmental agreements.
In Van Duren v. Chife,338 the First Houston Court of Appeals ex-
amined the law regarding the enforceability of as-is clauses with respect
to a residential house purchase. In the case at hand, the contract did not
specifically use the phrase “as-is,” instead it contained what the court de-
scribed as a “present condition clause.”339 Although the purchasers did
not obtain an inspection, they argued they relied on the written Disclo-
sure Notice where the sellers indicate that they were not aware of any
issues. In addition, the purchaser asserted there were verbal representa-
tions from the broker regarding a previous inspection that had not re-
vealed any issues. In Texas, “as-is” clauses are generally enforceable
provided that it is “an important part of the basis of the bargain, not an
incidental or ‘boiler-plate’ provision, and is entered into by parties of rel-
atively equal bargaining position.”340 However, an enforceable as-is
clause may be defeated if one of the following has occurred: (1) fraudu-
lent inducement;341 or (2) obstruction of the right to inspect.342 The pur-
chasers of the house argued that a “present condition” clause is not the
same as an “as-is” clause because it does not disclaim reliance. They were
unable to prevail on this point because Texas courts have long held that
“present-condition clauses operate as as-is clauses.”343 The court held
that the broker could not be liable for the seller’s disclosures because the
law imposes the obligation to disclose on the sellers only (not the broker)
unless there was some evidence that the broker had “any reason to be-
lieve that the sellers disclosures are false or inaccurate.”344 Because the
purchasers had waived the right to inspection, the purchasers were not
336. Id. (citing City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tex.
2006)).
337. Id. at 791 (citing City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Tex. 2007)).
338. 569 S.W.3d 176 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
339. Id. at 185–86.
340. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex.
1995); Bynum v. Prudential Residential Servs., 129 S.W.3d 781, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
341. Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 161–62; Bynum, 129 S.W.3d at 788.
342. See Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 162; Bynum, 129 S.W.3d at 788–89.
343. Van Duren, 569 S.W.3d at 186 (citing Lutfak v. Gainsborough, No. 01-15-01068-
CV, 2017 WL 2180716, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op.)). The language “in its present condition” is not ambiguous. See Birnbaum v. Atwell,
No. 01-14-00556-CV, 2015 WL 4967057, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 20,
2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Rather, “in its present condition” is a readily understood
equivalent of “as is.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 108–09, 1202 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
“as is” as “[i]n the existing condition without modification” and “present” as “[n]ow ex-
isting; at hand”).
344. Van Duren, 569 S.W.3d at 176 (citing Sherman v. Elkowitz, 130 S.W.3d 316, 320–21
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)). The seller’s liability was not addressed as
the sellers had counterclaimed and those claims were still pending. Id.
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able to prevail in their claim against the broker. It is important to point
out to Texas practitioners that the “present condition” clause at issue
here was the text from the promulgated Texas Real Estate Commission
form. The form has two options when it comes to acceptance of a prop-
erty’s condition; the Buyers either accept it: (1) “in its present condition”;
or (2) subject to specified repairs.345
VI. CONSTRUCTION MATTERS
A. BREACH OF CONTRACT
In De Avila v. Espinoza Metal Building & Roofing Contractors,346 the
Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that De
Avila breached a roofing repair contract with Espinoza when he evicted
Espinoza from a job site before work was finalized. Eduardo De Avila
entered into a contract with Espinoza Metal Building & Roofing Con-
tractor in February 2011 to preform roofing repairs.347 The contract re-
quired Espinoza to install a type of energy-efficient roofing-system, which
Espinoza had been specially certified to install by the manufacturer.348
The contract provided Espinoza would be paid $87,475 for the job.349 No
timetable or date of completion was specified for the installation, but the
contract provided that “[t]ime is of the essence of the Subcontract.”350 A
provision of the contract also allowed De Avila to terminate the contract
with or without cause by providing forty-eight hours notice of termina-
tion in writing.351 The contract further required that any modifications to
the agreement be made in a writing signed by both parties.352 Espinoza
and De Avila got into a dispute over a change order required to fix dam-
age to the roof already installed by Espinoza caused by the installers of
AC units. While Espinoza was waiting for De Avila’s agreement to the
requested change order, De Avila ordered Espinoza to vacate the job
site. De Avila never sent Espinoza a notice of termination as required by
the contract but instead hired another contractor to replace Espinoza.
Espinoza sued. The court found that
[w]hen a party to a valid and enforceable contract wrongfully inter-
feres with another party’s ability to render its performance under the
contract, and thereby makes the party’s performance impossible, the
party committing the interference is in breach of contract and the
afflicted party is entitled to damages sustained by the breach.353
345. Id. at 186.
346. 564 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).






353. Id. at 154–55.
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B. WAIVER OF CERTIFICATE OF MERIT
In LaLonde v. Gosnell,354 the Texas Supreme Court concurred with the
Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the Certificate of
Merit statute. In the case at hand, the Gosnells filed suit in September
2011 for structural damage to their home allegedly caused by the
destabilization of the foundation after a chemical was injected into the
soil.355 After mediation and discovery, the engineers filed a motion to
dismiss in January of 2015. This was over 1,219 days after the suit was first
filed.356 The motion to dismiss was based on the failure of the Gosnells to
abide by the Certificate of Merit statute when they filed their initial
suit.357 The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.358 The court of ap-
peals reversed the trial court, and the supreme court affirmed the court of
appeals’ holding.359 The Texas Supreme Court addressed this very issue
in Crosstex Energy Services, L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc.,360 where the supreme
court held that there was no one factor that would result in waiver. The
court of appeals found that the courts must look at the totality of the
circumstances.361 A review of recent cases shows that by and large the
lower courts are struggling to follow the guidance put forth by the Second
Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Gosnell that “a defendant may be consid-
ered to have waived the right to dismissal for failure to file a certificate of
merit when, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant has
substantially invoked the judicial process.”362 However, in the case at
hand, the court of appeals correctly found that the over three-year delay
in filing for dismissal, the participation in the discovery process and trying
to settle the case informally were all indications that “paint[ ] the picture




In Trial v. Dragon,364 the Texas Supreme Court overturned a summary
judgment holding granted by the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals
supported by finding estoppel by deed. In the case at hand, Leo Trial,
along with several of his siblings, owned real property.365 In 1983, Leo
gifted his wife, Ruth, with half of his one-seventh interest in the prop-
354. 593 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2018).
355. Id. at 1217.




360. 430 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2014).
361. Gosnell, 559 S.W.3d at at 568.
362. Id. at 561.
363. Id. at 567.
364. 593 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. 2019).
365. Id. at 314–15.
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erty.366 Nine years later, in 1992, Leo and his siblings purportedly con-
veyed the entirety of the land to the Dragons. Ruth did not sign the
conveyance.367 The conveyance contained a fifteen-year mineral reserva-
tion which terminated in 2008.368 Leo passed away in 1996, and Ruth
passed away in 2010.369 The issue in the case is whether Ruth’s sons in-
herited her one-fourteenth interest or whether they were estopped from
claiming the interest because their father had signed the warranty deed
claiming to convey the entire interest.370 The Dragons attempted to make
two different arguments to establish their primary claim to the property:
Leo’s sons are subject to (1) estoppel by deed; and (2) the doctrine of
after acquired property.
Over the years, the doctrine of estoppel by deed developed to stand for
the proposition that “all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals
therein, which operate as an estoppel, working on the interest in the land
if it be a deed of conveyance, and binding both parties and privies; privies
in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law.”371 The Dragons claimed
that because Leo’s sons ultimately inherited from their father they were
“privies in blood” and are estopped from claiming an interest in the prop-
erty contrary to the deed their father had signed.372 However, because
the sons inherited the property from their mother, who did not sign the
deed and who held the one-fourteenth interest as her sole property, they
did not hold the property as Leo’s privies but as Ruth’s.373 Therefore, the
supreme court held they are not estopped from claiming their interest in
the property.374 The Dragons also attempted to argue after-acquired
property but because Leo did not hold the property claimed by the Drag-
ons after the time it was conveyed to the Dragons, the after-acquired
property doctrine did not apply.375
Cochran Investments., Inc. v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.376 may have
drawn the most attention among the title cases during the survey period,
and it continues to draw debate. The facts of the case are fairly simple.
William England and Medardo Garza owned an east Houston duplex in
equal shares. Ownership of the duplex was subject to a deed of trust held
by EMC. England conveyed his one-half interest in the duplex to Garza
in September 2009. An involuntary bankruptcy proceeding was com-
menced against England in December 2009. England’s conveyance of his
interest in the duplex was set aside as a fraudulent transfer. EMC fore-
closed its lien on the duplex in December 2010 and the duplex was sold at




370. Id. at 314–15.
371. Id. at 318.
372. Id. at 316.
373. Id. at 324.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 323.
376. 550 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. granted).
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a foreclosure sale to Cochran for approximately $36,000.00. Cochran sold
the duplex to Ayers in June 2011 for $125,000.00. Cochran and Ayers exe-
cuted a residential sales contract and title was conveyed through a special
warranty deed. The deed’s granting clause states: “That Cochran Invest-
ments, Inc. . . . has GRANTED, SOLD AND CONVEYED and by these
presents does hereby GRANT, SELL AND CONVEY unto Grantee, all
of that certain tract of land lying and being situated in Harris County,
Texas described as follows . . . .”377 The granting clause is followed by a
description of the property. The deed also includes a special warranty
clause that states:
Grantor does hereby bind Grantor and Grantor’s successors and as-
signs to WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND, all and singular
the Property, subject to the matters stated herein, unto Grantee and
Grantee’s successors and assigns, against every person whomsoever
lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any party thereof by,
through and under Grantor, but not otherwise.378
“In connection with Ayers’s purchase of the duplex, Chicago Title is-
sued an Owner’s Policy of Title Insurance. Chicago Title agreed to ‘pay
[Ayers] or take other action if [Ayers] ha[d] a loss resulting from a cov-
ered title risk.’”379 Chicago Title was a party via contractual subrogation
after paying the loss to the buyer/insured. Ayers asserted claims for
breach of the implied covenant of seisin, breach of contract, money had
and received, and unjust enrichment. Ayers had suffered a complete fail-
ure of title due to a mishandling of the England bankruptcy. The court of
appeals found “that (1) the deed that conveyed the duplex to Ayers did
not imply the covenant of seisin; and (2) the merger doctrine bars recov-
ery for a breach of contract.”380
In order for a covenant of seisin to be implied, there must be a repre-
sentation or claim of ownership by the grantor. A covenant is implied in a
real property conveyance if
it appears from the express terms of the contract that “it was so
clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it
unnecessary to express it,” and therefore they omitted to do so, or “it
must appear that it is necessary to infer such a covenant in order to
effectuate the full purpose of the contract as a whole as gathered
from the written instrument.”381
In this case, there was only the standard “grant, sell and convey” lan-
guage—nothing about having the right and authority to sell and convey
or similar language.382 The “grant, sell and convey” language only implies
a covenant that the property has not been encumbered or previously con-
377. Id. at 199–200.
378. Id. at 200.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 205.
381. Id. at 202.
382. Id. at 203–04.
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veyed by the grantor.383
Moreover, the contract merged into the deed such that the breach of
contract claim for failure to deliver title did not stand.384 There is clearly
a drafting lesson in this case, both for the contract and possibly the deed,
as appropriate. As a result of poor drafting, the transaction suffered a
complete failure of consideration, but the seller/grantor kept the payment
for the property. Some commentators have noted the end result was the
same as delivering a quit claim. The controversy over the case continues
as the Texas Supreme Court granted the petition of appeal and heard oral
argument on January 30, 2020.
In Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Carduco, Inc.,385 the Texas Supreme
Court applied its analysis from Orca Assets (discussed in more detail in
last year’s Survey) to find that a dealership could not prevail on a fraudu-
lent inducement claim which was directly contradicted by the express
terms and conditions of the contract entered into by the parties. The facts
are simple: Mercedes-Benz and the plaintiff, Carduco, negotiated to buy
a Mercedes-Benz dealership. There was some evidence that Carduco’s
son had been urged by Mercedes to move the dealership to an alternative
location but never followed through. The father had several discussions
with Mercedes about possible alternative locations, and employees from
Mercedes even toured several of these locations. However, the express
terms of the contract entered into between the father and Mercedes spe-
cifically (1) prohibited Carduco from changing locations without Merce-
des’s written consent; (2) identified Carduco’s Area of Influence (a
geographic area that Mercedes assigned to the dealer for purposes of
evaluating the dealer’s performance); (3) stated that Carduco did not
have an exclusive right to sell Mercedes-Benz Passenger products in its
Area of Influence; and (4) specifically permitted Mercedes to add new
dealers or relocate dealers into Carduco’s Area of Influence.
Carduco argued he was justifiably entitled as a matter of law to rely on
statements made (or not made) by employees of Mercedes during negoti-
ations despite the fact that these statements were directly contradicted by
the agreement. The supreme court found that the franchisee had a duty
“to protect its own interests through the exercise of ordinary care and
reasonable diligence rather than blindly relying upon another party’s
vague assurances.”386 As the supreme court explained, if the issue was of
real importance, Carduco had a duty to make sure the contract reflected
the terms. Therefore, the fact that the contract directly contradicts the
terms was the franchisee’s fault not the franchisor’s. Carduco also argued
that Mercedes had a duty to disclose they were in negotiations with a
third party for the location. The supreme court disagreed, stating un-
383. Id.
384. Id. at 205.
385. 583 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. 2019).
386. Id. at 558 (citing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546
S.W.3d 648, 660 (Tex. 2018)).
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equivocally that “failure to disclose information does not constitute fraud
unless there is a duty to disclose the information.”387 The nature of the
franchisor/franchisee relationship is not one of a “fiduciary” nature.388
The results in Cochran and Carduco are supported by JPMorgan
Chase, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C.,389 discussed in last year’s Sur-
vey, in which the Texas Supreme Court declined to imply any covenants
when the contract (an oil and gas lease) allocated risk to the lessee and
warranties were expressly disclaimed.
TLC Hospital, LLC v. Pillar Income Asset Management, Inc.390
presented a number of issues at interest to real estate practitioner. In
TLC, the parties entered into a purchase and sale agreement regarding
an apartment complex. The first issue that arose was that although the
contract referenced an attached legal description, the parties failed to at-
tach the description so the only description of the property to be pur-
chased was the street address. The second issue was that the contract
required Pillar, the purchaser, to assume the Department of Housing and
Urban Development financing within fifteen days. TLC failed to provide
the necessary information to the lenders to allow Pillar to apply for and
assume the financing. TLC then terminated the contract and two months
later sent Pillar a letter of default. Pillar filed a lawsuit claiming breach of
contract and promissory estoppel among other claims. The trial court
granted Pillar specific performance and monetary damages equal to lost
revenue. TLC appealed on several issues, one of which is that Pillar
lacked standing because it was “never going to buy the property” because
the contract allowed for Pillar to assign the contract to a third party.391
TLC argued its performance was excused since Pillar breached the agree-
ment first and the contract did not contain a legal description; therefore,
it was void under the statute of frauds. In Texas, a “street address or a
commonly-known name for property may be a sufficient property
description if there is no confusion.”392
Teal Trading and Development, LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop-
erty Owners Ass’n393 involved the Declaration of Champee Springs
Ranches Property Owners Association that included a non-access ease-
ment which essentially restricted access to a main entrance creating a
“one-way-in-one-way-out” subdivision.394 The Declaration provided, es-
387. Id. at 562 (citing Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. 2001)).
388. Id.
389. Orca Assets, 546 S.W.3d at 648.
390. 570 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018, pet. denied).
391. Id. at 764.
392. Id. at 767; see Apex Fin. Corp. v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2004, pet. denied); see also Hahn v. Love, 394 S.W.3d 14, 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Nguyen v. Yovan, 317 S.W.3d 261, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Butler v. Benefield, 589 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas
1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); cf. A.A.A. Realty Co., Inc. v. Neece, 292 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Fort Worth 1956), aff’d 299 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1957).
393. 593 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2020).
394. Id. at 329.
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sentially, that the declarant reserved, for the exclusive use of declarant
and its successors and assigns, a one-foot easement for precluding and
prohibiting access to the property and other nearby roads by adjacent
property owners. It reserved one access entrance across the restrictive
easement for the Champee Ranches Subdivision, and no one else was to
be granted access without the consent of the declarant. After several
transfers and a foreclosure, Teal Trading acquired title to the 660-acre
tract referred to as the Privilege Creek Tract, which was subject to the
Declaration. Teal Trading also acquired the contiguous 1,173 acres, which
were not subject to the Declaration. However, the non-access easement
effectively divided the 1,173 acres owned by Teal Trading from the Privi-
lege Creek Tract it acquired. The prior owner of the Privilege Creek Tract
(Champee Springs) brought suit to enforce the non-access easement and
to prevent the development of the road crossing the non-access ease-
ment.395 At trial, Champee Springs sought enforcement of the non-access
easement by declaratory judgment; Teal Trading denied it was bound by
the restriction and sought a declaratory judgment that the non-access
easement was an unreasonable restriction against alienation and that
Champee Springs had waived its right to enforce the same.396 The trial
court, court of appeals, and Texas Supreme Court all found in favor of
Champee Springs.
Texas has adopted the Restatement of Property as to what constitutes
an unreasonable restraint on alienation, which can be summarized as fol-
lows: (1) a disabling restraint (attempt by a conveyance to make a later
conveyance void); (2) a promissory restraint (attempt to cause a later
conveyance to impose contractual liability on a subsequent conveyance,
where liability results from breach of an agreement not to convey); and
(3) forfeiture restraint (attempt to terminate all or part of the interest in
property conveyed). There was no direct restraint on alienation by virtue
of the non-access easement; the evidence presented at trial showed, at
best, an indirect restraint.397 An indirect restraint can only be stricken if it
bears some relationship to the evil which the rules prohibiting restraints
on alienation are designed to prevent, and the Restatement of Property
further provides that indirect restraints are valid unless they lack a ra-
tional justification, an issue on which Teal Trading failed to present any
evidence.398
Ultimately, the judgment that the non-access easement was valid and
enforceable was affirmed, based on the fact that negative easements and
restrictive covenants are expressly recognized as valid by the Restate-
ment of Property.399 The supreme court specifically declined to void the
restrictive access easement on public policy grounds.400
395. Id. at 328.
396. Id. at 329.
397. Id. at 336.
398. Id. at 337.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 338–39.
2020] Real Property 339
B. TRESPASS-TO-TRY-TITLE
In M&M Resources, Inc. v. DSTJ, LLP,401 the Ninth Beaumont Court
of Appeals once again reiterated that the proper way to establish title to
property is a trespass-to-try-title action and not a declaratory judgment
action and that parties could not attempt to “back door” into attorney’s
fees by bringing a declaratory judgment act claim.402 This complicated
lawsuit involved a dispute over mineral leases. M&M sought a declara-
tory judgment that it is “‘the owner of the mineral interests’ and award-
ing it title to all personal property and fixtures ‘located on, or held in
connection with the twenty-one (21) leases[.]’”403
Whether a claimant must seek relief related to property interests
through a trespass-to-try-title action, as opposed to a suit under the De-
claratory Judgments Act, has long been a source of confusion. “Gener-
ally, a trespass to try title claim is the exclusive method in Texas for
adjudicating disputed claims of title to real property.”404 The Declaratory
Judgment Act found at Section 37.004(a) of the Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code states a “person interested under a deed . . . or whose
rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a . . . contract . . .
may have determined any question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or
other legal relations thereunder.”405 Having rights under some instru-
ments determined in a declaratory judgment action can be efficient for
the parties.
The Texas Property Code provides a “trespass to try title action is the
method of determining title to lands, tenements, or other real prop-
erty.”406 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 783 through 809 governing tres-
pass-to-try-title actions require detailed pleading and proof. “[A] plaintiff
must usually (1) prove a regular chain of conveyances to the sovereign,
(2) establish superior title out of a common source, (3) prove a title by
limitations, or (4) prove title by prior possession coupled with proof that
possession was not abandoned.”407
If a dispute involves a claim of superior title and the determination of
possessory interests in property, it must be brought as a trespass-to-try-
title action.408 “Moreover, when the ‘trespass-to-try-title statute governs
the parties’ substantive claims . . . [a party] may not proceed alternatively
under the Declaratory Judgments Act to recover their attorney’s
401. 564 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2018, no pet.).
402. Id. at 454.
403. Id. at 453.
404. Id. at 454 (citing Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyers Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 389
(Tex. 2011)).
405. Id.
406. Id. (citing Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 735 (Tex. 2018)).
407. Id. (citing Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. 2004)).
408. Id. (citing Jinkins v. Jinkins, 522 S.W.3d 771, 786 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2017, no pet.) (citing Coinmatch Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909,
926 (Tex. 2013))).
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fees.’”409 Here, because the underlying dispute involved ownership of the
possessory interest in the mineral estates at issue, the supreme court con-
cluded the proper and mandatory vehicle for resolving those claims is a
trespass-to-try-title action.410
C. EASEMENTS
In R2 Restaurants, Inc. v. Mineola Community Bank, SSB,411 the
Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals addressed the issue of the termination
of easements for non-use. In 1994 a piece of property adjacent to a Wal-
Mart parking lot consisted of two vacant lots. Wal-Mart conveyed the
parcels to Perimeter along with easements that burdened the Wal-Mart
property and allowed pedestrian and vehicle ingress and egress to the
extent necessary and convenient for access to State Highways 37 and 564.
In 1995, Perimeter conveyed the northern portion of the parcel (Tract 2)
to UP Enterprises for a Taco Bell franchise. Perimeter and UP also en-
tered into a reciprocal easement agreement (REA) that stated in relevant
part:
UP Enterprises, Inc. does hereby grant to Perimeter Properties, L.P.
a perpetual, non-exclusive easement for vehicular and pedestrian in-
gress and egress over and across the drive lanes, sidewalks and en-
trances on Tract 2 identified as (the “Access Easement 2”) attached
hereto as Exhibit D and made a part hereof. Perimeter Properties,
L.P. shall use Access Easement 2 for vehicular and pedestrian in-
gress, access, and egress. The Access Easement 2 granted hereunder
is a permanent easement and will continue in full force and effect so
long as the easement is used by the owners of Tract 1 and Tract 2, its
successors and assigns pursuant to this document recorded in the
Real Property Records of Wood County, Texas. The Access Ease-
ment 2 shall be used by Perimeter Properties, L.P., its customers,
employees, tenants and invitees.412
409. Id. (citing Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 267).
410. Id. 454–55 (first citing Lackey v. Templeton, No. 09-17-00183-CV, 2018 WL
3384570, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 12, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); then citing
Jinkins, 522 S.W.3d at 786)).
411. 561 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018, pet. denied).
412. Id. at 648–49.
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The REA provided that the covenants, conditions, and restriction
should remain in place for fifty years.413 UP established a “mutual ac-
cess” lane between the two tracts, but Perimeter never installed the “mu-
tual access driveway.”414 UP owned and operated a Taco Bell franchise
continuously on Tract 2 since 1995. Tract 1 remained vacant until 2002.415
In 2002, Perimeter and UP entered into an amendment to the REA.416
Fifteen Thirteen, LLC acquired Tract 1 and established a car wash in
2002.417 The car wash was demolished in 2011.418 Fifteen Thirteen sold
the South Lot to MCB.419 In 2016, R2/Taco Bell commenced reconstruc-
tion and built a dumpster enclosure over the southeast easement and
closed the curb cut on the west side.420 The Texas Department of Trans-
portation denied MCB’s permit to build the south access to Highway
564.421 MCB filed suit for declaratory judgment that the REA remained
in effect and granted MCB access over the north lot.422 R2 counter-
claimed that the REA terminated from non-use, breach of the REA for
failure to construct the Highway 564 entrance, and no access rights pursu-
ant to the Wal-Mart easement.423 The trial court found for MCB and the
court of appeals affirmed.424 The court of appeals found that, with respect
to the termination of an easement, the “intent to abandon an easement
must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence, and abandonment
of an easement will not result from nonuse alone; instead, the circum-
stances must disclose some definite act showing an intention to abandon
413. Id. at 649.
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and terminate the right possessed by the easement owner.”425 The REA
stated it “will continue in full force and effect so long as [they are] used
by the owners of Tract 1 and Tract 2, [their] successors and assigns.”426
Although the durational clause only applied to covenants and restric-
tions, the court of appeals held that the trial court could have used the
fifty-year term as a guide in its decision making as to what period of time
was a reasonable period of nonuse.427
The REA mandated that UP install the curb cuts but contained no sim-
ilar requirement with respect to Perimeter.428 The REA only stated the
“access easement” includes common areas as “may from time to time ex-
ist on [the south lot].”429 The court concluded that based on the use of the
word “may” there was nothing in the REA, requiring Perimeter, or its
successors, including MCB, to construct a curb cut, driveway, or other
entryway from the south lot to Highway 564, and the owners of the south
lot’s failure to undertake such construction, without more, had not inter-
fered with R2’s right of access to that portion of the south lot. Therefore,
MCB as Perimeter’s successor was not in breach for failure to have con-
structed the Highway 564 entrance.430
In Clearpoint Crossing Property Owners Ass’n & Cullen’s LLC v.
Chambers,431 the First Houston Court of Appeals dealt with the interpre-
tation of express easements and whether an easement by necessity could
exist when a property had access via express easements that were less
convenient.432 To understand how the issues arose, first you have to un-
derstand the history. “Drill Site BB” was a seven-acre tract that was once
owned by Exxon. The Chambers then owned 32 acres that included “Drill
Site BB.” Exxon first owned Drill Site BB and then later bought the re-
maining part of the Chambers Site before selling the land in its entirety.
At one point, Exxon had an easement that gave access across the
Clearpoint tract but abandoned that easement in exchange for two ex-
press easements which, collectively, gave Exxon access across the
Clearpoint Tract to Spacepoint Boulevard. Both easements explicitly
stated their purpose was to give “‘free and uninterrupted pedestrian and
vehicular ingress to and egress from’ a parcel of the Chambers tract iden-
tified as ‘Drill Site B.’”433 The Chambers bought the land and began us-
ing the easements for the benefit of the entire property.
425. Id. at 654 (citing Toal v. Smith, 54 S.W.3d 431, 437 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet
denied)).
426. Id.
427. Id. at 656.
428. Id. at 655.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. 569 S.W.3d 195 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
432. Id. at 197.
433. Id. at 198.
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At the jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Cham-
bers which held that: (1) the express easements provide an unqualified
right of access to the entire tract; and (2) an implied easement by neces-
sity existed which also had an unqualified right of access.434 The court of
appeals reversed, finding that: (1) the terms of the express easement were
unambiguous and limited the access to Drill Site BB; and (2) because
there was an express easement giving access, there could not be, by defi-
nition, an implied easement by necessity.435 An easement of necessity re-
quires a showing that there is “no way” to access its land without the
easement.436
The holding of the court of appeals should come as no surprise to real
estate practitioners, following as it does from well-established case law
learned in law school.437 In fact, the most surprising portion of case came
in a separate concurring opinion related to denial of en banc reconsidera-
tion. In that decision, Justice Goodman discussed the court’s rationale
behind inferring an obligation into the “express” easements for the domi-
nate estate holder to pay a portion of the upkeep and maintenance even
though the easement was silent as to maintenance and upkeep terms.438
The court relied on the Restatement of Property which states that unless
an easement states otherwise “joint use by the owners of the dominant
and servient estates ‘gives rise to an obligation to contribute jointly to the
costs reasonably incurred for repair and maintenance of the portion of
434. Id. at 199.
435. Id. at 202.
436. Id. at 202–03.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 203–04.
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the servient estate or improvements used in common.’”439 In Justice
Goodman’s opinion he stated that he felt the “joint-contribution rule” is
likely to be adopted by the Texas Supreme Court.440
The message for practitioners, who may have adopted the attitude over
the years to be “silent” on the sometimes controversial issue of mainte-
nance expenses, is that doing so is no longer a wise strategic course dur-
ing negotiations because the courts may very well read such terms into
your agreement whether you intended it or not.
Similar issues regarding implied easements were broached in Trujillo
Enterprises, Ltd. v. Davies.441 To understand the issues in this case, the
practitioner both has to understand the history and the layout of the
property. The property was the old “Harry Mitchell Brewery” located in
El Paso, Texas that was originally developed in 1933 and was subdivided
sometime in 2008 into two parcels. The first parcel was purchased by the
Parkers and represented the southeastern portion of the property. The
second parcel was purchased by Trujillo Enterprises and represented the
northeastern end of the property.
439. Id. at 204 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (Servitudes) § 4.1.3(3)).
440. Id.
441. 573 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).
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The property was bordered on the entire east side by a railroad right of
way so all access must be from the western side. Trujillo leased their
property to a variety of businesses, including, but not limited to, a furni-
ture maker who occupies the property immediately to the north of the
Parker’s property and accesses the loading dock via North Lattas Street,
which separates the Parker property from the Trujillo property. The
Parker’s deed granted them ownership over the street up to the edge of
the loading dock. The Parkers had previously allowed the furniture
maker to access their property but, in 2013, began closing the gate to the
loading dock. Trujillo claimed an implied necessity easement.442 The trial
court found that there was no implied easement and the Eighth El Paso
Court of Appeals agreed. Texas recognizes two forms of implied ease-
ment: (1) by necessity; and (2) prior use easements.443 The authors dis-
cussed the law regarding necessity easements above, and it was clear in
this case that the owner could not say there was “no other way” to access
the loading dock.444 In fact, the evidence at trial established there were
possible alternative options but that these options had not been investi-
gated, thereby ruling out the ability to establish easement by necessity.
Because of the historical difficulty with meeting the high standards for an
easement by necessity, the courts in Texas developed the doctrine of prior
use,445 which is applicable when “a landowner can show a historical use
and some reasonable necessity.”446 However, the “Texas Supreme Court
has recently made clear that a necessity easement is the only option for
one landowner seeking a roadway across another landowner’s prop-
erty.”447 Because Trujillo was unable to meet the strict necessity test, he
could not successfully impose a roadway easement across the Parker’s
land.448 Trujillo’s land failed the test because: (1) the parcel is not land-
locked; (2) only one particular use of the building is impaired (use of the
loading dock); and (3) although perhaps expensive, or not convenient, the
testimony established it was likely that Trujillo could have gained access
via his own property (something he did not bother to investigate before
filing suit).449
442. Id. at 302.
443. Hamrick v. Ward, 446 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex. 2014) (first citing Koonce v. J.E. Brite
Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex. 1984) (necessity easement); then citing Bickler v. Bickler,
403 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1966), abrogated by Hamrick v. Ward, 446 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex.
2014) (prior use easement)).
444. Trujillo, 573 S.W.3d at 307 (citing Duff v. Matthews, 311 S.W.2d 637, 643 (Tex.
1958)).
445. Id. at 306.
446. Id.
447. Id. (citing Hamrick, 446 S.W.3d at 384 (“We clarify that courts adjudicating im-
plied easements for roadway access for previously unified, landlocked parcels must assess
such cases under the necessity easement doctrine.”)).
448. Id.
449. Id.
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D. PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE OBLIGATIONS
The Attorney General of Texas, Ken Paxton, issued an opinion on
April 23, 2018, regarding the limitations imposed on private transfer fee
obligations pursuant to Section 5.201 of the Texas Property Code.450 A
“private transfer fee” is defined by the Texas Property Code as “an
amount of money, regardless of the method of determining the amount,
that is payable on the transfer of an interest in real property or payable
for a right to make or accept a transfer.”451 The legislation became effec-
tive on June 17, 2011, and made any transfer fee obligation created after
the effective date of the legislation void and unenforceable. To the extent
a private transfer fee obligation was in existence prior to the legislation,
the recipient of the fee was required to file a “Notice of Private Transfer
Fee Obligation” (complying with the requirements provided in the legis-
lation) in the real property records on or before January 31, 2012, and at
certain regular intervals.452 The legislation also required a seller of prop-
erty to provide notice to the purchaser of the private transfer fee obliga-
tion. The Attorney General issued the following opinions with respect to
the legislation:
(1) Failure to strictly comply with the notice requirement in all re-
spects voids the private transfer fee obligation.
(2) Although failure to provide notice to a purchaser does not void the
obligation, the purchaser may attempt to void the transaction.453
E. RESTRICTIONS
A fascinating case that settled a split between several different courts is
Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n,454 where the Fourth San
Antonio Court of Appeals examined the interpretation of the “residen-
tial” restrictions and the short-term rentals of homes. In Tarr, a home-
owner entered into thirty-one short-term rental arrangements that
totaled 102 days over five months.455 The deed restrictions for the
Timberwood Park Owners Association (the HOA) provided that homes
should be “used solely for residential purposes.”456 The HOA notified
Tarr that renting out his home was a commercial use and a violation of
the deed restrictions.457 Tarr filed a declaratory judgment action seeking
a declaration that leasing the house was a residential purpose and there
was no “durational” requirement in the deed restrictions.458 Tarr and the
HOA both filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court
450. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0195 (2018).
451. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.201(4).
452. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0195 (2018).
453. Id.
454. 510 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016), rev’d, 556 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. 2018).
455. Id. at 727.
456. Id. at 729.
457. Id.
458. Id.
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granted the HOA’s motion.459
On appeal, Tarr argued the following: (1) the HOA allows rentals and
does not require that a homeowner personally occupy his home; and (2)
the individuals that Tarr rented to were using the house for residential
purposes.460 Relying on the San Antonio Court of Appeals opinion in
Munson v. Milton,461 the HOA argued that short-term renters were not
residents but “transients.”462 The court of appeals agreed with the HOA.
Although the appeals court noted that “[c]ovenants restricting the free
use of land are not favored by the courts, [they] will be enforced if they
are clearly worded and confined to a lawful purpose.”463 Furthermore,
Section 202.003(a) of the Texas Property Code requires that “[a] restric-
tive covenant shall be liberally construed to give effect to its purpose and
intent.”464 In this case, the court of appeals found the restrictive covenant
to be unambiguous.465 The court went on to note that, as noted by the
Munson court, the “Texas Property Code draws a distinction between a
permanent residence and transient housing, which includes rooms at ho-
tels, motels, inns and the like.”466 The court also agreed with the Munson
court that the term “‘residence’ generally requires both physical presence
and an intention to remain.”467
The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals and clearly
stated that the lower court’s obsession with Section 202.003(a) of the
Texas Property Code was misplaced.468 In their eyes, the issue was not
one of “strict” or “liberal” construction of the covenants.469 Instead, the
covenant at issue simply did not address the use contemplated by the case
at hand.470 The lower courts held that Tarr had leased to groups consist-
ing of “multiple” families at one time, thereby violating the “single-fam-
ily” residence restrictions.471 The supreme court held that the restriction
referred to the type of housing that could be constructed—not the com-
position of the family or individuals that could inhabit the home.472
With respect to the second argument put forth by the association, that
“residential” use did not include transient use, the supreme court noted
that the HOA was once again focused on the wrong language.473 The
covenant stated that “no business shall be conducted on any of these
tracts which is noxious or harmful,” thereby by focusing on what is hap-
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. 948 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
462. Tarr, 510 S.W.3d at 729.
463. Id. at 728.
464. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.003.
465. Tarr, 510 S.W.3d at 731.
466. Id. at 730 (citing Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 817).
467. Id.
468. Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. 2018).
469. Id. at 279.
470. Id. at 277.
471. Id. at 278.
472. Id. at 279.
473. Id. at 288.
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pening on the property rather than how the owner is using the prop-
erty.474 Furthermore, the supreme court directly addressed its
disapproval of findings of other courts in similar cases that “impose an
intent or physical-presence requirement when the covenant’s language in-
cludes no such specification and remains otherwise silent as to durational
requirements.”475
F. PARTITION
In Bowman v. Stephens,476 the First Houston Court of Appeals was
asked to once again decide the equity of partition in kind versus partition
by sale. As most practitioners are aware, the courts in Texas prefer parti-
tion in kind, and the party seeking partition by sale has the duty to prove
that partition in kind is “impractical or unfair.”477 The case involved an
approximately 117-acre waterfront property that had been held by a fam-
ily for generations. Three siblings now owned the property. Two of the
three siblings wanted to sell the entire property while the third sibling
wished, for sentimental reasons, to retain a small portion of the property
that contained an old family cottage and a dock. The decision was compli-
cated by the fact that the entire parcel was practically land locked and a
large portion was “unbuildable” because it was on a large rock slope.478
A portion of the property did have access through a verbal license from a
neighbor, but there were no enforceable easement agreements that could
be conveyed to third parties. These limitations caused extremely diver-
gent estimates to be received from the siblings’ various experts depending
on whether the estimate was for the entire parcel, the sale price for equal
thirds, or the sale price with or without access. The trial court found the
property was susceptible to partition in kind, and the brothers ap-
pealed.479 The brothers had the burden of proving that partition in kind
would not be fair and equitable. The evidence presented at trial was con-
flicting, and it was within the trial court’s authority to determine. The
court of appeals upheld the trial court’s holding.480
Rodriguez v. Rivas481 was another partition case in which the trial court
ordered a unique solution when a couple broke up and one member re-
quested that a home they owned as co-tenants be partitioned by sale. The
trial court ordered that one party had right to possession of the house
while the other would be paid back their portion of the value over time.
The Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed the decision holding
that the law in Texas is clear: “Texas law will not force a reluctant joint
474. Id. at 289.
475. Id. at 291.
476. 569 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
477. Id. at 220.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 210.
480. Id.
481. 573 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.).
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owner of real property to maintain joint ownership.”482 The court further
held that although Texas courts prefer partition in kind, if partition in
kind is not possible, as both parties agreed it was not in this case, parti-
tion by sale is the only option.483 The court elaborated on their decision
to overturn the trail court’s arguably more “equitable holding” by
explaining:
[e]quitable rules apply in determining how the property is to be par-
titioned, once partition is granted, but equitable principales [sic] are
not material in determining whether or not the right of partition may
be exercised. It may sometimes be inequitable to one or more of the
joint owners if another co-owner is permitted to enforce partition of
the jointly owned property; but this is one of the consequences which
one assumes when he becomes a co[ ]tenant in land. If he does not
provide against it by contract, he may expect his cotenant to exercise
his statutory right of partition at will.484
VIII. HOMESTEAD/HOME EQUITY LENDING
A. NEW CONSIDERATION; PLACE OF TENDER
In Mulvey v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n,485 the Eighth El Paso Court of
Appeals addressed sufficiency of summary judgment evidence after a
foreclosure on a home equity loan. The homeowner, Mulvey, alleged ille-
gality of a modification to his home equity loan; however, he did not
specify any details in his affidavit to support such proposition. Because
Mulvey was not an expert witness, his lay conclusions were non-evidence
as to the illegality issue.486 Nevertheless, the court surmised that Mulvey
was complaining that the capitalization of interest violated the constitu-
tional requirements for an extension of credit.487 When the modification
was effected, the existing unpaid interest was capitalized and added to the
principal balance of the loan to be repaid.488 The Texas Supreme Court
held in Sims v. Carrington Mortgage Services, L.L.C.489 that there was no
additional extension of credit where “the restructuring of a home equity
loan that . . . involves capitalization of past-due amounts . . . is not a new
extension of credit that must meet the requirements of [Texas Constitu-
tion, article XVI] § 50.”490 The court viewed such holding as being similar
to the subject case.491 But, the court of appeals included caveats to its
holding that such restructure must not be a “satisfaction or replacement
482. Id. at 451 (citing Bowman v. Stephens, 569 S.W.3d 210, 220 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] (2018, no pet.)).
483. Id. at 452.
484. Id. at 453 (citing Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337, 338–39 (Tex. 1943)).
485. 570 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).
486. Id. at 361.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 357.
489. 440 S.W.3d 10, 15 (Tex. 2014).
490. Mulvey, 570 S.W.3d at 361 (citing Sims, 440 S.W.3d at 17).
491. Id.
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of the original note, an advancement of new funds, or an increase in the
obligations created by the original note.”492 The court did not discuss
these qualifications, except to emphasize a specific recitation in the modi-
fication agreement that the loan documents would “remain unchanged”
and that the parties would be bound by the original documents “except as
specifically amended.”493 To these authors, it was reasonable to assume
that the no increase in the original debt was satisfied because the capital-
ized interest was part of the original debt and is not new debt, but that
means that the future interest will be greater because the principal had
been increased. Based on Sims and Mulvey, that result will not be new
consideration under the applicable constitutional provision.
Mulvey next argued that he made a proper tender of payment that was
refused, which should have excused his performance. Mulvey’s affidavit
asserted an attempted tender sometime during the month of July or Au-
gust at a Texas Wells Fargo Bank branch, which the court held was a
wrongful tender because the note required payment to an address in Bal-
timore, Maryland.494 Further, Mulvey’s affidavit indicated that his tender
was of one monthly payment when there were additional monthly pay-
ments due.495 The court concluded that Mulvey made an improper tender
of payment, noting that proper tender required a tender at the proper
place and time specified in the contract.496 Additionally, the court con-
cluded the Mulvey did not present evidence as to how a single payment
refusal, even if improper, would excuse all subsequent payments.497 So,
for practitioners, the question is how many improper payment refusals
are necessary to sustain such a payment defense, if tender was at the ex-
act location required for payment under the contract?
B. RES JUDICATA
In Perry v. CAM XV Trust,498 discussed in more detail above at II.F.,
the First Houston Court of Appeals addressed the res judicata doctrine in
a home equity lending scenario. In Perry, the debtor brought a 2012 suit
alleging Deceptive Trade Practice Act violations, but the creditor did not
assert foreclosure claims in that suit.499 Perry claimed such failure acti-
vated the res judicata bar on subsequent foreclosure claims. In rejecting
that position, the court cited Steptoe v. JPMorgan Chase Bank500 for the
proposition that due to the alternative foreclosure remedies in a home
equity deed of trust (being either a judicial foreclosure or a non-judicial
foreclosure), that the res judicata doctrine was not applicable.501 The
492. Id. (citing Sims, 440 S.W.3d at 17).
493. Id.
494. Id. at 363.
495. Id. at 358.
496. Id. at 363.
497. Id.
498. 579 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
499. Id.
500. 464 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
501. Perry, 579 S.W.3d at 778.
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Steptoe court concluded that the alternative remedies could not form the
basis for res judicata because that would have allowed the debtor to force
the creditor into an election of remedies (judicial foreclosure instead of
non-judicial foreclosure) in the prior suit, which would be inconsistent
with the alternative provisions contained in the deed of trust contractual
provisions, and, therefore, this circumstance was an exception to the res
judicata doctrine.502
A sole dissenting opinion by Justice Goodman argued that the subject
case was substantially similar to McKeehan v. Wilmington Savings Funds
Society,503 where the debtor was allowed to assert a payment defense in a
subsequent foreclosure action despite the lender’s assertion of res judi-
cata as a “weapon” to thwart a payment defense.504 The majority in Perry
distinguished McKeehan on the basis that no foreclosure action was
pending in McKeehan’s prior constitutional challenge suit and, therefore,
res judicata did not apply, whereas in Perry, the debtor did not assert
constitutional home equity lending claims in the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act suit despite the anticipated foreclosure proceedings.505 The dis-
sent characterized McKeehan simply as holding that “the doctrine of res
judicata did not apply to previously unasserted defenses to foreclosure in
a [subsequent] judicial foreclosure action.”506 Both McKeehan and Perry
involved a number of prior foreclosure attempts and a suit on other
grounds before the then current foreclosure action alleging res judi-
cata.507 The dissent found these cases indistinguishable and characterized
the majority’s opinion as abandoning McKeehan and sowing confusion.
Because of this, the dissent suggested it would invite more litigation on
these issues in the future.508 Without intervening Supreme Court jurispru-




1. Proof of Liability
Texas Windstorm Insurance Ass’n v. Dickenson Independent School
District509 involved insurance coverage issues caused by Hurricane Ike.
The dispute between the insured and insurer ultimately resulted in the
insurance company requiring an appraisal pursuant to the terms of the
policy. An appraisal was obtained four years after the hurricane and
502. Id. at 778–79.
503. 554 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). This case was dis-
cussed in more detail by the authors of last year’s Survey article. See J. Richard White et
al., Real Property, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 320 (2019).
504. Perry, 579 S.W.3d at 781.
505. Id.
506. McKeehan, 554 S.W.3d at 701.
507. Perry, 579 S.W.3d at 783.
508. Id. at 783–84.
509. 561 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
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found damages to the Dickenson Independent School District (School
District) in an amount in excess of $10,000,000.00. The School District
filed summary judgment motions based upon the appraisal award with
respect to causation of the damages and the amount of the damages; the
trial court granted those motions.510 The insurer challenged the summary
judgment awards, alleging that the appraisal award, being the only sub-
stantive piece of evidence submitted for the partial summary judgment
motion, was insufficient to carry the insured’s burden. The appraisal
award purported to set forth the amount of damages covered by the in-
sured losses; however, the court, relying on State Farm Lloyds v. John-
son511 held that the appraisal was limited to determining the amount of
loss, not whether an insurer was liable to pay (i.e., a covered loss).512
Consequently, practitioners should be mindful of the need to provide ex-
pert testimony on the causation of the damage and not rely on an ap-
praisal award to establish a covered loss.
B. APPRAISAL AWARDS
This year’s Survey period covered a number of cases dealing with alle-
gations of an insurer’s breach of contract based on the initial estimate of
damages being less than the amount of damages ultimately determined
by an appraisal award issued pursuant to the insurance policy’s appraisal
provisions, even when the appraisal provision was elected after com-
mencement of a breach of contract suit against the insurer.513
In Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds,514 the Texas Supreme Court agreed that
“an insurer’s payment of an appraisal award in the face of similar allega-
tions of pre-appraisal underpayment forecloses liability on a breach of
contact claim.”515 Furthermore, as to an insured’s bad faith claim for ad-
justing a loss, the supreme court confirmed appellate court cases that the
discrepancy between an initial estimate and an appraisal award amount
did not constitute intentional under-valuation of the claim, absent evi-
dence of an independent injury.516 But, as to the insured’s claim under
the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA),517 the supreme court
stated that the “insurer’s payment of an appraisal award does not as a
matter of law bar an insured’s claims under the [TPPCA].”518
510. Id. at 269–70.
511. 290 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009).
512. Tex. Windstorm, 561 S.W.3d at 278.
513. See Biasatti v. Guideone Nat’l Ins. Co., 560 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2018), rev’d, No. 18-0911, 2020 WL 1898538 (Tex. 2020); Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 568
S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 589 S.W.3d 127
(Tex. 2019); Hinojos v. State Farm Lloyds, 569 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet.
granted).
514. Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2019).
515. Id. at 132.
516. Id. at 133–34 (citing USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479 (Tex.
2018)).
517. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.
518. Ortiz, 589 S.W.3d at 135 (citing Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, 589
S.W.3d 806 (Tex. 2019)).
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In Barbara Technologies. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds,519 the Texas Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of liability for damages for delayed pay-
ments under the TPPCA.520 A wind hailstorm caused damage to Barbara
Technologies’ commercial property on March 31, 2013.521 Barbara Tech-
nologies filed a claim with State Farm on October 17, 2013, which was
denied on November 4, 2013, because State Farm’s assessment of dam-
ages was less than the deductible under the policy. A request for a second
inspection resulted in no change; therefore, Barbara Technologies filed
suit on July 14, 2014. State Farm invoked the appraisal provisions under
the policy on January 9, 2015. The final appraised value agreed upon was
$195,000.00, which was determined on August 18, 2015, received by State
Farm on August 19, 2015, and paid on August 25, 2015. Barbara Technol-
ogies alleged that State Farm violated the TPPCA by not paying within
the sixty-day statutorily required time limit.522 In defense, State Farm as-
serted that such a claim was not available after State Farm had paid the
appraisal award amount.
Upon appeal from summary judgment motions, the supreme court con-
sidered the interplay between the TPPCA and the policy’s appraisal pro-
visions, found that the TPPCA did not address the appraisal process, and
concluded that the TPPCA contained neither deadlines for the appraisal
process nor exemption of the appraisal process from the TPPCA dead-
lines.523 The supreme court specifically disapproved of prior cases that
excused an insurer from prompt payment liability because it paid an ap-
praisal award.524 The TPPCA did not impose liability upon invocation of
the appraisal process, but it did impose liability after the insurer accepts
liability or is otherwise adjudicated liable on the claim;525 however, pay-
ment of a claim did not, by itself, establish the liability element.526 In
other words, an appraisal award establishes only the amount of the dam-
ages, not liability under the policy. The conclusion, as stated by the court,
was “that invocation of the contractual appraisal provision . . . neither
subjects an insurer to TPPCA damages nor insulates the insurer from
TPPCA damages.”527
In his dissent, Justice Boyd concluded that the voluntary and uncondi-
tional payment of the appraisal award was a concession of liability and
claim amount by the insurer.528 An additional dissent by Chief Justice
Hecht and Justices Brown and Blacklock characterized the majority as
ignoring several Texas appellate courts, the Fifth Circuit, and U.S. Dis-
trict Courts for all four Texas districts, and the absence of changes to the
519. Barbara Techs., 589 S.W.3d 806 (Tex. 2019).
520. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.
521. Barbara Techs., 589 S.W.3d at 809.
522. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 542.055(a)(1)–(3), .056(a), .058(a), .060.
523. Barbara Techs., 589 S.W.3d at 814.
524. Id. at 819.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 820.
527. Id. at 827.
528. Id. at 829.
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statute from eight legislative sessions holding that payment of an ap-
praisal award avoids penalty liability under the TPPCA.529 Based on the
split decision in Barbara Technologies, practitioners must wonder what




In In re Luecke,530 a limited partner in a derivative action attempted to
waive a conflict of interest of his attorney who represented not only the
limited partnership but also another defendant in a case concerning ac-
tions of the person who was the general partner of the partnership. In
what appears to be a case of first impression, the Third Austin Court of
Appeals concluded that the limited partner had a right to bring a deriva-
tive action on behalf of the limited partnership, the right to choose an
attorney, and the right to waive any potential conflicts of interest for pur-
poses of the derivative action.531
2. Former Member Review of Records
Davis v. Highland Coryell Ranch, LLC532 addressed the issue of
whether a former member of a limited liability company had access to the
LLC’s books and records. Davis was an original member of Highland
Coryell Ranch, LLC (Highland), but had relinquished his interest prior to
the time he made a request to see Highland’s books and records for the
time he was a member. Although some books and records were pro-
duced, others were not. Highland alleged that as a former member, Davis
was not entitled to see any books or records of the LLC. The appellate
court held, in a specifically narrow holding, that “a former member of a
limited liability company is not prohibited from accessing business
records of the company for a proper purpose simply because he is not a
member at the time of the request.”533
In reaching such conclusion, the Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals
analyzed Texas Business Organizations Code Section 101.502(a), which
provided a “member of a limited liability company . . . may examine and
copy at any reasonable time . . . records required under Sections 3.151
and 101.501; and . . . other information regarding the business, affairs, and
financial condition of the company that is reasonable for the person to
examine and copy,”534 and Texas Business Organizations Code Section
3.153, which provided that “[e]ach owner or member . . . may examine
529. Id. at 845.
530. 569 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.).
531. Id. at 381.
532. 578 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, pet. denied).
533. Id. at 249.
534. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.502(a).
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the books and records” of the LLC entity.535 Additionally, Texas Busi-
ness Organizations Code Section 1.002(53)(A) defined a “member” as “a
person who is a member or has been admitted as a member in the limited
liability company under its governing documents.”536
Under these statutory parameters and standard statutory construction,
the court of appeals held that it must give effect to the additional phrase
“or has been admitted as a member” and concluded that the only feasible
purpose for this language was to describe former members who were not
currently a member of the LLC.537
A dissenting opinion by Justice Campbell took issue with the court’s
interpretation and holding as to the meaning of the second phrase in the
statute.538 To these authors, it appears to be a rather weak and misleading
dissent because the majority was addressing only rights as it related to
review of books and records of the entity. But, the dissent, heading down
a rabbit hole, discussed the interpretation in the context of former mem-
ber’s approval for admission of new members, issuance of cash calls, dis-
tributions to members, annual meetings, membership approvals, and that
an assignor of a membership interest remaining a member until the as-
signee becomes a member of the company.539 As stated above, this dis-
sent seems to be misguided and hopefully will not be cited in further
cases addressing such issue.
D. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF – IRREPARABLE INJURY
Flamingo Permian Oil & Gas L.L.C. v. Star Exploration, L.L.C.540 in-
volved a dispute between the operator of an oil and gas lease and the
non-operating interest holder under a joint operating agreement. Fla-
mingo, as the operator, had performed poorly, and Star called a meeting
of interest owners to dismiss Flamingo. Flamingo filed suit to enjoin such
action, and the court discussed the requirements for a temporary injunc-
tion.541 Due to the nature of the future production of oil and gas, an exact
value of loss could not be established; however, the court noted that, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the injury element could be satis-
fied by a showing that the defendant could not pay damages.542 Star
presented the following evidence: Flamingo “repeatedly failed to pay
debts, allowed liens to accrue against the property in violation of the
[joint operating agreement], and did not participate in legal proceedings
535. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 3.153.
536. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 1.002(53)(A).
537. Davis, 578 S.W.3d at 246, 247. Interestingly, the court cited The Animals’ hit rock
song Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood. Id. at 248.
538. Id. at 249.
539. Id. at 249 n.1.
540. 569 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).
541. Id. at 330–31. The elements to obtain a temporary injunction are: “(1) a cause of
action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable,
imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Id. at 332.
542. Id.
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such that several default judgments had been taken against Flamingo.”543
The Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals concluded this was sufficient to
satisfy the injury element.544
E. DUTY TO LICENSEE
Wilson v. Northwest Texas Healthcare System, Inc.545 is instructive as to
the various types of plaintiffs to which premises liability suits are applica-
ble. In this case, Wilson was visiting his wife in a hospital run by North-
west Texas Healthcare. Walking down the hall, Wilson passed between a
cleaning machine and an elevator and slipped on alleged water on the
floor. The hospital’s floor technician (janitor), Hill, was transporting the
cleaning machine to another floor at the time of the accident. After hav-
ing cleaned it, Hill verified that it was drained and dry and had not no-
ticed any water on the floor prior to the fall. In considering the motion
for summary judgment, the court noted there were three types of claim-
ants: invitees, licensees, or trespassers.546 An invitee status occurs when
the person entered the property with the owner’s knowledge and for the
mutual benefit of both owner and the invitee.547 A licensee is one who
entered the premises with the owner’s consent, but for the licensee’s own
convenience or “business with someone other than the owner.”548 And
finally, a trespasser is a person who entered without permission. The
court of appeals concluded that Wilson was a licensee since he entered
with consent but without business with the owner, his business being
purely for his own purpose in visiting with his wife.549 Therefore, the duty
owed to such licensee was “not to injure the licensee willfully, wantonly,
or through gross negligence,” and if knowledge of the dangerous condi-
tion was known, “to warn [licensee] of or make safe the dangerous
condition.”550
F. DUTY TO WARN
Reyes v. Brookshire’s Grocery Company551 involved a slip and fall on a
grocery store premise. Reyes entered the grocery store and at the end of
a refrigerated aisle, passed a three and one-half foot tall four-sided yellow
sign which read “caution/wet floor.”552 As an invitee, Reyes was owed a
duty by Brookshire’s Grocery to keep the premises safe or to warn of the
dangerous condition. Therefore, the Twelfth Tyler Court of Appeals con-
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. 576 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.).
546. Id. at 850.
547. Id. (citing Am. Indus. Life Ins. Co. v. Ruvalcaba, 64 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)).
548. Id. (citing Mayer v. Willowbrook Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 278 S.W.3d 901, 909 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)).
549. Id.
550. Id. (citing Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 391 (Tex. 2016)).
551. 578 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, no pet.).
552. Id. at 590.
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cluded that Brookshire’s Grocery’s duty with respect to the defective
condition was discharged by its warning of the condition, in the form of
the yellow sign, which a reasonable person would have perceived and
understood.553
G. CONDEMNATION
KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett,554 the Texas progeny of
Kelo v. City of New London,555 addressed the applicable Takings Clause
under the state constitution. Here, KMS owned a commercial tract of
land with retail establishments fronting Lakeview Parkway, but with a
private access road along the rear of the property paralleling Lakeview
Parkway and connecting with the street on the western boundary, Ken-
wood Drive. The property to the east was owned by Briarwood, which
was negotiating with Sprouts Farmers Market for a grocery store on its
tract. Desperate to attract Sprouts to its community, the city entered into
an economic development agreement with Briarwood to facilitate leasing
of the site to Sprouts. Sprouts’ lease required access westward to Ken-
wood Drive along the private road or a significant reduction in rent
would result. Briarwood attempted to negotiate access rights to connect
with KMS’s existing private road, but such negotiations proved fruitless.
Condemnation proceedings were commenced by the city, and a motion
for summary judgment was rendered against KMS and in favor of the
city, to which an appeal was taken. The Dallas Fifth Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the city.556 Review was granted, and the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed the decisions.557 At issue was whether (1) the recent
Texas statute limiting public use condemnation558 was applicable to such
taking; and (2) the taking was appropriate under the Takings Clause of
the Texas Constitution.559 These constitutional and statutory provisions
provided the framework for a lawful condemnation, which required a
public use560 and that the taking be necessary for a public use.561 Both
the constitutional and statutory takings provisions were affected in 2005
by the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelo, which held that a
city could condemn a private home as part of an economic redevelop-
ment plan that would turn over the taken land to a private business.562 In
response to the Kelo case, the Texas legislature, in a special called session,
553. Id. at 594.
554. 593 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. 2019).
555. 454 U.S. 469 (2005).
556. KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 559 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2017), aff’d, 593 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. 2019).
557. KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d at 175.
558. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.
559. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
560. Id. Section 17 reads “[n]o person’s property shall be taken . . . or applied to public
use without adequate compensation being made . . . .” Id.
561. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 251.001(a) (“[w]hen the governing body of a municipal-
ity considers it necessary, the municipality may exercise the right of eminent domain for a
public use to acquire public or private property . . . .”).
562. KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d at 181–82.
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adopted a more limited condemnation statute.563 That statute prohibited
takings (1) that “confer[ ] a private benefit on a . . . private party”; (2)
“for a public use that is merely a pretext to confer a private benefit to a
particular private party”; (3) “for economic development purposes”; or
(4) “not for a public use.”564 However, there was an exception to such
prohibition that authorized the taking of private property for transporta-
tion projects, including public roads.565
First, the supreme court analyzed the statutory provision and deter-
mined that the transportation exception overruled the prohibitions in the
statute “ulterior motives notwithstanding.”566 The supreme court rea-
soned that there was “no statutory language ‘on which to add an excep-
tion to the application of [the transportation exceptions to the
prohibitions] if a transportation project is illegitimate.’”567 The essence of
the supreme court’s opinion was summed up as follows:
[a]ccordingly, if a taking is for a transportation project, the con-
demnor is constrained only by the statutory provisions that grant it
condemnation authority (and any other relevant statutes) and the
limitations imposed by the constitution and our case law. The con-
demnor is free of the additional limitations imposed by section
2206.001(b).568
In furtherance of such position, KMS argued that the subject taking
was not for a “transportation project” for a “public road.”569 In support
of its nontransportation argument, KMS relied upon definitions in the
Regional Mobility Authority Act.570 Those provisions were distinguished
by the supreme court as relating to a different purpose than the use of the
words in the statutory takings prohibitions exemption.571 With respect to
the public roads challenge, KMS argued that the private road did not
meet the width standards in the city’s Master Thoroughfare Plan. But the
supreme court decided that the common meaning of public road would
override any local municipality’s standard for a road,572 and relied upon
the city’s council resolution authorizing the need for the acquisition of the
private roadway of KMS.573
Next, the supreme court turned to its constitutional analysis of public
use. Under the Texas Constitution, a taking is authorized for just compen-
563. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2206.
564. Id.; KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d at 178.
565. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2206.001(c)(1).
566. KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d at 183.
567. Id. at 181 (citing Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2012)).
568. Id. at 184.
569. Id. at 185.
570. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 370.031(a).
571. KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d at 185. The distinction being that the Government Code
related to condemnation for transportation projects, whereas the Regional Mobility Au-
thority Act defined transportation projects only for the administrative purpose of authori-
zation of types of projects greater than local roads or minor rural collector roads. Id.
572. Id. at 186.
573. Id.
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sation only when there is a public use.574 Considering what a public use
included, the supreme court noted that the public must derive “some def-
inite right or use in” the property taken,575 and that it was immaterial if
the use was limited to citizens of only a local neighborhood so long as it
was open to all other citizens.576 However, “a private benefit [for] a pri-
vate party” had previously been denounced.577 Also, the supreme court
noted that the determination of a public use was a legislative decision, to
which the courts should give deference.578 This deference for determina-
tion of public use by a governmental authority can be overturned only by
judicial review when the decision “was fraudulent, in bad faith, or arbi-
trary and capricious.”579 Public use was involved in this taking, because
(1) the city council resolutions stated its necessity; (2) a city staff report
indicated such a road would serve a public purpose, provide better circu-
lation between retail locations, reduce traffic flow on the main artery
(Lakeview Parkway), and provide emergency vehicle access to first re-
sponders (however, the court in a footnote noted that an internal city
report would receive less deference than other evidence);580 and (3) the
testimony of the director of economic development stated the necessity
of the access easement between the adjoining properties.581 There was no
evidence submitted by KMS that negated any of such public purposes.582
Much of KMS’s defense relied upon what it alleged were the improper
motivations of the city; however, the court refused to consider the ulte-
rior motive of the city when a facially valid public use was presented. Any
issues as to fraudulent activity had to be addressed separately under the
judicial exclusions for constitutionality of takings by means of fraud, bad
faith or arbitrary, or any capricious action.583
Consequently, the supreme court considered the potential fraudulent
actions of the city. First, the supreme court defined fraud in the condem-
nation context. It was wrongly defined by the appellate court, which used
the typical common law fraud definition.584 In the context of a condem-
nation case, fraud existed when “contrary to the ostensible public use, the
taking would actually confer only a private benefit.”585 In other words,
the taking of property for a public use can be fraudulent even if there was
574. Id. at 181.
575. Id. at 187 (citing Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Pate, 309 S.W. 2d 828 (Tex.
1958)).
576. Id. (citing Hous. Auth. of City of Dall. v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.
1940)).
577. Id. (citing Maher v. Lasata, 354 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1962); Phillips v. Naumann, 275
S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1955)).
578. Id. at 182.
579. Id. at 184 (citing City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. 2012)).
580. Id. at 188 n.1.
581. Id. at 188.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 189–90.
585. Id. at 190 (citing FKM P’ship, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Hous. Sys., 255
S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2008) (quoting City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex.
2012)).
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not “fraudulent intent on the part of the condemnor,” if the public use is
only a guise for private use.586 KMS alleged that the city’s ulterior motive
was to provide an economic benefit to Briarwood, Sprouts, or both. How-
ever, the city was considering condemnation before Briarwood was una-
ble to negotiate an easement because the Sprouts deal would not have
been consummated without an easement, and there was no evidence ne-
gating a need for traffic relief or emergency vehicle access.587 The su-
preme court determined that the economic incentive did “not negate any
of the city’s ostensible public uses justifying the taking.”588 Consequently,
the motive behind the taking, as long as it provided a public use, and not
solely a private benefit, would not be questioned.589 KMS argued that
there was quid pro quo between the city and Briarwood evidenced by a
letter amendment to the economic development agreement that reduced
the payments the city would make to Briarwood by the costs incurred in
connection with the condemnation process. But this was viewed as noth-
ing more than favorable negotiations.590 Further, the court refused to
read “nefarious motives” into deferring condemnation until after private
negotiations failed and reducing the economic benefits by its costs of con-
demnation.591 Practitioners should consider the daunting task of proving
that no public use could ever be established for any particular taking.
But, there was a rather powerful dissent by three justices, making this
opinion a 6–3 decision. The dissent agreed with the majority’s ruling that
such Texas condemnation statute was not applicable because of the speci-
ficity of the statutory exclusionary language for transportation projects.
Instead, the dissent focused on the deference to governmental body deci-
sions,592 and argued for (1) overruling of existing precedent due to the
Texas constitutional 2009 amendment; (2) eliminating deference to gov-
ernmental declarations of public use; and (3) shifting the burden of proof
to the government.593 Current judicial precedents, believed the dissent,
were not based upon the current Texas Constitution; they were based
upon principles developed under the pre-2009 amendments to the Texas
Takings Clause.594 Such amendments, in response to Kelo, reflected the
Texas limitation of governmental taking powers, and a new line of rea-
soning should be developed based upon such amendments requiring own-
ership, use, and enjoyment by the public as a whole.595
As to its deference position, the dissent urged the court to continue to
move away from the undue deferential authority given governmental en-
tities, asserting that “‘[u]nadorned assertions of public use are constitu-
586. Id. (citing City of Austin, 384 S.W.3d at 779).
587. Id. at 188.
588. Id. at 191.
589. Id.
590. Id. at 193.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 195.
593. Id. at 195–96.
594. Id. at 197–98.
595. Id. at 195–98.
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tionally insufficient’ in determining whether a use will ‘in fact be public
rather than private.’”596 The dissent quoted favorably from the Kelo dis-
sent of Justice O’Connor, claiming that “no coherent principle limits what
would constitute a valid public use.”597 Also, the dissent delved into the
murky distinction between a “public use” and a “public purpose,” noting
that the current Texas Constitution’s “public use” requirement had al-
ways required that the property taken must be used for ownership, use,
or enjoyment by the government or public at large.598 The dissent also
complained that limiting a property owner’s constitutional defenses to
fraud, bad faith, and arbitrariness, was confusing and had no precedent
for excluding other defenses.599 Consequently, the dissent would shift the
burden of proof to the government to prove it had a legitimate public use
purpose as a condition to the condemnation.600
Moreover, to further confuse practitioners, the majority opinion ad-
dressing the dissent, noted the persuasive comments as to reconsideration
of the changes in judicial interpretation after the 2009 constitutional
amendments and the prior public use jurisprudence, and stated that the
majority “would welcome the opportunity to further explore [the dis-
sent’s] position in a future case in which the issue is directly
presented.”601 Based on KMS Retail, practitioners should realize that the
saga will continue on how public use condemnations will be governed.
X. CONCLUSION
This year’s cases again emphasized the need for careful and considered
drafting in contracts of all types. (1) Deeds of trust need a proper tenant
at sufferance clause (Isaac); (2) security agreements benefit from a well-
drafted non-waiver clause (Fab Tech); and (3) clear terms of un-condi-
tionality in a guaranty are important (Wyrich). Also, proper drafting was
critical in the anti-deficiency limitations waiver contained in Godoy. On
the other hand, proper drafting would have avoided the satisfaction of
debt issues presented in Quintanilla.
But, other cases left open, or created, issues for the future. In Orr, is-
sues remain on proper accounting for contribution among co-guarantors.
Differences in proving debt exist after Duarte-Viera. The necessary ele-
ments for an outsider reverse veil-piercing claim were questioned in the
Yamin dissent. Issues of res judicata in foreclosure actions subsequent to
prior litigation is still open to further jurisprudence after Perry. And fi-
nally, the jurisprudence on “public use” condemnation should have been
further resolved in KMS, but was, more likely, turned on its head.
596. Id. at 195 (citing Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex.,
LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012)).
597. Id. at 197.
598. Id. at 197–98.
599. Id. at 199–200.
600. Id. at 199.
601. Id. at 194.
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Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Texas Outfitters,
and its adoption of the “we know it when we see it approach” all but
guaranteed there will be future litigation over the duty of Executive
Rights holders in the state of Texas. An almost equally controversial deci-
sion in Rohrmoos will have practitioners questioning their historical lease
negotiating strategy and investors questioning the security of their invest-
ments as it no longer matters whether your lease contains a termination
option: the Texas Supreme Court will, under certain circumstances, sim-
ply imply one exists.
Texas courts have now adopted an outsider reverse veil-piercing theory
in Yamin. The failure to take remedial action may not necessarily waive a
secured party’s interest according to Fab Tech. The supreme court has
now resolved that insurance appraisal awards address only damages and
not liability issues per Barbara Technologies (at least until the composi-
tion of the supreme court changes).
